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collapse of communism. The approach Russia's government uses to control this increase
will be a test of its democratic foundations. Democratic police methods are necessary as
the nation overcomes more than seventy years of Communist police terror and moves
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The transition to democratic police operations in Russia requires introducing and
teaching new concepts of policing that include respect for human rights, dignity, integrity,
accountability and professional competence. Police operations that observe the rule oflaw
are a critical element of domestic security in any democratic society and require the
fundamental driving force to be the laws of the state. Unlike the Western European
empires of Britain and France, Russia and then the Soviet Union did not incorporate the
legal ideals of the Enlightenment into the state's philosophy of government. Therefore,
the Soviet Union failed to establish a true legal framework to regulate many aspects of
police operations. The transition to democratic police practices requires a re-focusing of
the basic use of police, from instruments of state control to protectors of public safety.
The international community has taken steps to promote democratic human rights
and individual safeguards around the world. In countries such as Panama, Haiti,
Guatemala, and now Bosnia, the international police community has attempted to spread
the fundamental principles of democratic police operations to improve the human dignity
and quality ofworld wide police operations. There are seven principles that must be
introduced as states make the transition from authoritarian regimes to democratic
societies. These are:
IX
1) An orientation to democratic principles that include adherence to the rule of
law and regulations. A key to this is the maintenance of free and open elections.
2) Adherence to a code of conduct which encourages and requires professionalism
and methods of policing corruption and abuse of authority.
3) Protection and safety ofhuman life. This requires a restraint on the use of and
methods of force in the application of laws.
4) A motivation for public service to the people ofthe state, not a particular
individual leader or government.
5) Police operations focused upon the fight against crime involving persons and
property, not the political control or legitimacy of the current government.
6) A respect for human rights in all methods of investigation and incarceration.
7) Efforts for an unbiased application ofthe laws of the state in a non-
discriminatory manner to all citizens.
Russian police operations require reform with regard to all seven ofthese
principles. This requirement stems from the lack of an established rule of law and from
the principles that inspired the police forces after the Bolshevik Revolution. The Russian
police transition from Communist Party rule to a democratic system with a dedication to
law has been turbulent due to a tradition encompassing the political use of police. Russia,
like many aspiring democracies, has found that the international community is ready to
make an effort to assist it in police reform.
While maintaining more individual freedoms than dictatorships, democratic
societies also generally have greater incidence of crime than totalitarian police states. In a
democracy, it is vital that the methods and practices used by police to balance order and
freedom be subject to close scrutiny. The elements of organized and domestic crime,
common to open market societies, have in many ways compromised the strides taken by
both Soviet General Secretary, then President, Mikhail Gorbachev between the years 1985
to 1991 and President Boris Yeltsin from 1992 to 1996. Russia has experienced a rapid
growth in domestic and organized crime since the collapse ofcommunism in 1991 . The
methods and approach the government uses to curb and control this increase in crime will
be a test of its democratic foundations.
O. THESIS STATEMENT
This thesis shows that democratic police operations are an essential foundation for
a state's transition to democracy and examines the problems presented in the democratic
transition of a totalitarian police society with no true foundation in the rule of law.
Specifically, it shows that the Russian transition to democratic police operations is strained
due to a significant reliance on presidential decrees instead of legislative anti-crime acts
and the rule of law. The seven internationally agreed upon democratic police principles
provide a basis to evaluate the current reforms in Russia.
m. CONCLUSIONS
The leadership of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs has made several efforts
in a positive direction. Both the qualitative and quantitative efforts to recruit, train and
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maintain professional law enforcement officers and the progress made toward a standard
of public service are fundamental. Given the positive presidential efforts to eliminate
corruption and enhance international training, the Russian police appear dedicated to
establish the laws and policies designed to move closer to democratic police operations.
Police operations need to function in accordance with a Rechtsstaat concept, enabling a
society to have the knowledge and access to the law that is essential to hold the state
accountable to its own laws.
It appears that until the Russian legislature can enact positive measures to combat
crime the police will continue to be directly subordinate to the Russian President.
Measures to combat crime and move the police toward more democratic efforts will
remain vested in presidential decrees and directives.
Overcoming the seventy years of Communist police terror has not been easy.
While Soviet President Gorbachev made the initial steps to provide for greater individual
rights, he was confronted with the need to restore order. This led to an excessive use of
the police for political purposes. IfPresident Yeltsin continues wrestle with the
legislature, Russia's dedication to move toward the rule oflaw and democratic police
operations may be stifled. With a concerted effort at reform, as younger generations of
policemen are trained, not only in Russia but throughout the world, the fundamental
principles of professional police conduct and the motivation for public safety will take
hold. From the initial successes shown in the international training efforts to improve
Russian police motivation for public service and human rights, to an effort to reduce
xn
corruption with Operation "Clean Hands," the environment is ripe in Russia to espouse the
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The necessary transition to democratic police operations in Russia requires
introducing and teaching new concepts of policing that include respect for human rights,
dignity, integrity, accountability and professional competence. Police operations that
respect the rule of law are a critical element of domestic security in any democratic society
and require the fundamental driving force to be the laws of the state. Unlike the Western
European empires of Britain and France, Russia and then the Soviet Union did not
incorporate the legal ideals of the Enlightenment into the state's philosophy of
government. Therefore, the Soviet Union failed to establish a true legal framework to
regulate many aspects of police operations. The transition to democratic police practices
requires a re-focusing ofthe basic use of police, from instruments of state control to
protectors of public safety.
The historical evolution of the rule of law and democratic police methods in
democracies throughout the world has common threads linked to the continental and
colonial traditions ofWestern Europe. Democratic policing developed a criminal
procedure that provides safeguards for defendants and creates separation between courts,
prosecutors and police. These safeguards are inherent in the rule oflaw in any democratic
society. Police operations in democratic societies are bound by them as these safeguards
are critical to domestic security and require the unbiased application of force in upholding
the laws ofthe state.
The international community has taken steps since the creation of the United
Nations to promote democratic human rights and individual safeguards around the world.
In countries such as Panama, Haiti, Guatemala, and now Bosnia, the international police
community has attempted to spread the fundamental principles of democratic police
operations to improve the human dignity and quality ofworld wide police operations.
There are seven principles that must be introduced as states make the transition from
authoritarian regimes to democratic societies. These are:
1) An orientation to democratic principles that include adherence to the rule of
law and regulations. A key to this is the maintenance of free and open elections.
2) Adherence to a code of conduct which encourages and requires
3) Protection and safety ofhuman life. This requires a restraint on the use of and
methods of force in the application of laws.
4) A motivation for public service to the people ofthe state, not a particular
individual leader or government.
5) Police operations focused upon the fight against crime involving persons and
property, not the political control or legitimacy of the current government.
6) A respect for human rights in all methods of investigation and incarceration.
7) Efforts for an unbiased application ofthe laws of the state in a non-
discriminatory manner to all citizens.
Russian police operations require reform with regard to all seven of these
principles. This requirement stems from the lack of an established rule oflaw and from
the principles that inspired the creation of the police forces after the Bolshevik Revolution.
The Communist methods of a totalitarian police state maintained and harshened Russia's
traditionally authoritarian police methods. Russia, like many emergent democracies, has
found that the international community is ready to make an effort to assist it in police
reform.
The Russian police transition from Communist Party rule to a democratic system
with a dedication to law has been turbulent due to a tradition encompassing political use
of police. From 1917 to 1991, each Soviet leader applied the police apparatus differently,
but always to ensure communist rule. This resulted in a continuous pendulum swing of
limited progress toward and then abrupt digression away from reform.
The largest fluctuation of use was evident in the post-Stalin years [1953-1991] as
Soviet leaders attempted to move away from police terror but still maintain central control
over the society by using the police as a political tool. From Nikita Khrushchev's weak
approach to reform, Leonid Brezhnev's lack of change and increased use ofthe
nomenklatura system, Yurii Andropov's goals of reducing corruption, Mikhail
Gorbachev's inability to overcome the dilemma of a liberalized Soviet society with a
maintenance of social order and central control, to Boris Yeltsin's use of Presidential
Decrees; Soviet police operations have been manipulated to meet the needs of a particular
party or leader, and not the protection of the citizen. It is this protection ofthe individual
citizens of the state that is a pillar in democratic police operations.
While maintaining more individual freedoms than dictatorships, democratic
societies generally have a greater incidence of crime over that of a totalitarian police state.
In a democracy, it is vital that the methods and practices used by police to balance order
and freedom be subject to close scrutiny. The elements of organized and domestic crime,
common to open market societies, have in many ways compromised the strides taken by
both General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev (1985-1991) and President Boris Yeltsin
(1991 -present). Russia has experienced a rapid growth in domestic and organized crime
since the collapse ofcommunism in 1991 . The methods and approach the new democratic
government uses to curb and control this increase in crime will be a test of its democratic
foundations.
The adoption and implementation ofthe international principles of democratic
policing are essential for Russia's transition to democracy. After a legacy ofCommunist
police manipulation, the reforms and initiatives taken by the Russian government from
1991 to 1996 have opened the door to change, support by international cooperation to
assist in the establishment of democratic principles of police operations.
The main argument of this thesis is that democratic police operations are an
essential foundation for a state's transition to democracy. This thesis examines the
problems presented in the democratic transition of a totalitarian police society with no true
foundation on the rule of law. Specifically, it shows that the Russian transition to
democratic police operations is strained due to a significant reliance on presidential
decrees instead of legislative anti-crime acts and the rule of law.
l
Chapter II reviews the
historical development of democratic police operations and presents the seven
internationally agreed upon democratic police principles. These principles, when applied
within one of three historical models of police operations, provide a basis to evaluate the
current reforms in Russia. Chapter III provides a brief historical view of the Russian and
Soviet traditions of policing and highlight the attempts at reform prior to 1991 . Chapter
IV will discuss the democratic police transitional efforts of President Yeltsin and the
Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs. Finally, the concluding Chapter evaluates the reforms
discussed in Chapter IV in light of the principles established in Chapter II. This final
chapter shows that the current reforms in the Russian Interior Ministry (MVD) are
progressing slowly and appear to be headed in the proper direction.
1 The term police is used throughout this thesis in place of the Russian militia to avoid confusion. This
thesis does not address the issues related to the Interior Troop section of the Russian Interior Ministry.
This militarized police element is used to maintain internal security and combat demonstrations and other
significant domestic disorders.

II. HISTORICAL AND DEMOCRATIC POLICE CONCEPTS
Some of our people seem to understand democracy as being able to
do whatever they want, as a result bespredel [society's conduct is
without limits or bounds] has completely overtaken us. Now, we
have wild democracy, an epidemic of seizing everything in sight, of
getting rich at any cost.
Aslambek Aslakhanov, Supreme Soviet Parliamentary
Committee on Law and Order, 1992. 2
"Democracy" has become a rallying cry of most newly independent states
throughout the world. However, a problem lies in an over use of this word, especially
when it is poorly defined. According to Robert Dahl, modern democracies consist of
seven distinct institutions, which are summed up well by Joshua Muravchik in his article
Promoting Peace Through Democracy. Muravchik defines democracy "to consist of
three elements: principal government officials are chosen in elections that are free, open,
and relatively fair; freedom of expression; and the rule of law."3
Rule of law differs from rule by law. The latter can easily be used by totalitarian
and authoritarian regimes as mechanisms to control society. Conversely, the first does not
imply the manipulation of laws and courts to serve the motives of a tyranny, but rather
requires government to function according to a publicly known set of established rules.
The rule oflaw emphasizes the rights of individual citizens and places constraints upon
2
Cited in Handelman Stephen. Comrade Criminal. (New Haven:and London Yale University Press,
1995), 4.
3
Muravchik, Joshua. "Promoting Peace Through Democracy." Managing Global Chaos: Sources ofand
Responses to International Conflict. Edited by Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osier Hampson with Pamela
Aall. (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), 585nl.
law enforcement officials. These constraints includes regulations, rules, and procedures;
used to enforce the law and maintain order. As such, police operations in a democracy
must also function with a commitment to the rule of law. This is the fundamental principle
that allows the leaders of the state to operate with legitimacy and ensures the people retain
a confidence in the ideals ofjustice and the law.
While democratic nations are not guaranteed to be free of police corruption and
abuses, the system has the tools and capacity for investigating and dealing with situations
of corruption or violations of citizen's rights. All democratic police agencies maintain
ethics and a standard of conduct that allows the profession to police the conduct of its
own. The proper balance of an officers' code of conduct coupled with methods to reign in
officials who abuse the established professional responsibility, lead to increased public
trust. This chapter will provide an historical review and describe the fundamentals of
democratic police operations. After providing a view on the role of the rule of law in
democratic society, I will provide a look at three traditional models of police in history
and outline the development of the principles that drive democratic police operations
regardless of the police model adopted by a democratic state.
A. RULE OF LAW AND SOCIETY
The early Anglo-Saxon idea of police accountability to the rule of law is a tradition
that has continued to develop in all democracies to the present day. The ideas that those
who perform the duties of law enforcement, and criminal justice officers, should do so
with professionalism and a sense of ethics can be most readily discerned from
developments in the 19th century. Emile Durkheim described what maybe distinct about
the concept of a 'professional' group. "It is not merely that such groups have high status,
or high skill, or a politically supported monopoly over certain kinds ofwork - most
important is an infusion ofwork and collective organization with moral values, plus the
use of sanctions to insure that these moral values are upheld."
4
Too often we think of law only in the context of civil and criminal conduct,
forgetting that law is related to the entire structure of society, including its government.
"Thus the biblical insistence on the responsibility of people ~ even of monarchs ~ to
God's law turned the political tide in those countries where the Reformation emphasized
the Bible as the only final authority took root."3 In England the threat of absolutism of
the monarch, with no higher authority, was slowly diminished and increasingly men began
living without fear of arbitrary revenge. When the state permitted the teachings of the
Bible to bring forth its natural conclusions that there is a higher authority for which all
members of the state are responsible, it was able to have structure and freedom in both
society and government. This allowed the individual to call into question the right or
wrong actions of government. "The 'little man,' the private citizen, can at any time stand
up and, on the basis of biblical teaching, say that the majority is wrong. So, to the extent
4
Cited in Skolnick. Jerome H. Justice Without Trial: Law Enforcement in Democratic Society. (New
York: John Wiley & Sons. Inc, 1966). 235.
5
Schaeffer. Francis A. How Then Should We Live?: The Rise and Decline of Western Thought and
Culture. (Illinois: Crossway Books. 1976), 108.
to which the biblical teaching is practiced, one can control the despotism of the majority
vote or the despotism of one person or group."
6
As monarchical rule declined and democracy began to develop, notable authors
were concerned with its emerging tenets. Thomas Hobbes is credited with the idea that
government must have absolutist powers to guide the people and ensure individuals did
not destroy one another, as he felt they were naturally inclined to do. Conversely, John
Locke, often termed the father of modern liberalism, stressed the importance of personal
liberty and individual rights. This idea, however, presented some concern for Alexis de
Tocqueville. He was focused on what was termed the "tyranny ofthe majority." He
stressed that the concern for modern democracy should be to ensure the majority does not
stifle individual rights to expression. Jean Jacques Rousseau answers this with his
argument that individual freedom would theoretically be reflected in the "general will,"
through a social contract. The utopianism of this concept was evident throughout the
French Revolution's Reign of Terror. During this period, the gaining ofthe general will
meant not only the loss offreedom for the individual, but the reign ofthe guillotine.
Actually, one did not have to wait for the Reign of Terror to see the flaw in this idea. It
was already in Rousseau's own writing. Rousseau's idea of autonomous freedom clashed
with his presentation when he moved from the individual to society. In The Social
Contract (1762) he writes,
In order that the social compact may not be an empty formula, it tacitly
includes the undertaking, which alone can give force to the rest, that




whole body. This means nothing less than that he will be forced to be
free.
7
Humanistic utopianism ends in tyranny, whether in Rousseau's writing or in the Reign of
Terror which carried his position to its conclusion. Roland Stromberg points out that
initially many of the English parliamentary defenders of liberty were concerned the demos
could be as dangerous to liberty as the unrestrained authority of the throne. Eventually,
the English Constitution brought with it an acceptance of universal suffrage as the
parliamentarians ensured the general citizenry could not easily alter it significantly.
"Constitutionalism, often linked to democracy, is undemocratic in essence, rooting law
and policy in a written constitution not easily amendable and subject to interpretation by
an independent, non-elective judicial authority."8 The state power locked in a
constitution, carried with it both a limit on oppression and a requirement for maintaining
the demos in an acceptable order.
This is aligned with the basic idea of the modern state as interpreted by Max
Weber. This requires states to possess a means to control order within its territorial limits.
For Weber and others who subscribe to the theory of the Machtstaat, the direct control of
the means of internal and external violence is the distinguishing feature of state power.
This complements the modern theory that one element of a nation state is the ability to
control a defined bordered territory with legitimate force. Police can therefore be seen as
"a mechanism for the distribution of non-negotiable coercive force and as the special
Quoted in Ibid.. 155.
8
Stromberg. Roland N. Democracy: A Short Analytical History. (New York: M.E. Sharpe. 1996), 9.
11
repository domestically of the state's monopoly of legitimate force; police is the label and
policing the means used when asserting the state's exclusive authority to the use or threat
of the use of force within its territory."9 Hence, police operations are directly connected
to the larger interests and authority of the state, and the method in which they are
employed directly has an impact on the state's legitimacy.
B. DEMOCRATIC POLICE MODELS
"The idea of rechtsstaat, a rule-of-law state, was a fundamental concept of
nineteenth-century German jurisprudence. According to this legal model, individuals and
institutions were subordinate to the written law."
10
This is the basic principle used by
democratic states to develop operational law enforcement methods and models with a
characteristic pattern of compliance. This pattern has special arrangements for gathering
information, processing offenders, and evaluating the competence of law enforcement
personnel under the rule of law. "The idea of operational law enforcement should suggest
both the attitudes and behavior of policemen responding to judicial rulings, and
interpersonal relations with the accused, the prosecutor, defense attorney, judge, and
whenever applicable, with the general public." 11
9
Anderson, Malcom, Monica den Boer, Peter Cullen. William Gilmore. Charles Raab. and Neil Walker.
Policing the European Union. (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1995), 90.
10
Shelley. Louise I. Policing the Soviet Society: Evolution ofState Control. (New York: Routledge.
1996). 7.
1
' Skolnick. Jerome H. Justice Without Trial: Law Enforcement in Democratic Society. (New York:
John Wiley & Sons. Inc, 1966), 18.
12
The essence of law in a society is ultimately dependent upon its political and social
philosophy. "When law is viewed primarily as an instrument of education or as an
instrument of order, rather than as a goal in itself, the society no longer conceives of
punishment as a last resort, to be used only reluctantly. Soviet morality permits the
government to threaten pain in order to push the citizen to many acts to which it cannot
yet pull him by hope of reward."
12
Conversely, democratic policing is founded on a
consensus between the police and the pubic. lj Since the police's work really begins at the
point where consensus breaks down, it is essential that democratic policing methods
include remedies to violations of human rights and unprofessional conduct. "From its
inception, therefore, the decentralized institution of the American police was in structure
and function fundamentally different from the police model adopted by Russia and
subsequently, by the Soviet Union." 14
Communist police operations were rooted in a Soviet tradition of police terror and
represented a centralized form of policing whose scope and authority far exceeded that of
earlier historical models. "In contrast to (European) continental and colonial police
models, the Soviet militia represented and enforced conformity with a state ideology that
proscribed a wide range ofhuman activity and justified a single party's monopoly of
power."




Liang. Hsi-Huey. The Rise ofModern Police and the European State Systemfrom Metternich to the
Second World War. (Cambridge: University Press. 1992). 317.
14




dominate almost all aspects of Soviet life. This application of police operations was often
used more forcefully in periphery states to establish control of the new Soviet society.
"Similar to other imperial police forces, the Soviet militia focused less on preventing and
detecting crime in the 'colonized' non-Russian areas and more on protecting state property
and maintaining social and political control." 16 The police were accountable not to the
citizens of the state but the Party and ultimately its leader. The police became a leading
apparatus of the state as a "guardian of ideology" and thus the police destroyed all it
should normally uphold: law, morality, justice and safety. 17
Police in most industrialized countries tend to fall into one of three basic
organizational and operational models of policing. The exact model each state uses to
manage its' monopoly on the internal use of force is dependent upon any variables. These
include political ideology, evolution of policing within the state, perception of the state's
citizens on issues of governmental authority, and the role of police in the society. 18 There
are several differing terms used in defining the model of policing used by states. I have






The Encyclopedia ofPolice Science, 485.
The Encyclopedia ofPolice Science uses the terms Centralized. Coordinated, and Fragmented Lousie
Shelley uses the terms Continental. Colonial and Anglo-Saxon. David Bayley use the terms Centralized
and Decentralized in his book Patterns ofPolicing: A Comparative International Analysis. (New
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1985). 54. All have similar and applicable uses that describe the
model of historical and present day policing throughout the world.
14
1. Continental Model
Police were first established as an institution in the late 1600's when political
power rested with the monarch or emperor. These police were most often centralized
military forces subordinate to the state. The French Revolution made a significant
influence on European monarchies. A vital framework developed in France after the 1 789
Revolution that served to protect the citizens from unlimited state power. The idea of
civil liberties was based upon the idea that power should never be exercised in the absence
of law. This along with industrialization, urbanization and the birth of the modern
bureaucratic state forced western European states to consider and accommodate the
interests of their rising working class. 20 Thus, what evolved was a rise of state paternalism
and the idea that citizens should be protected with their social welfare enhanced. By
assigning many functions of the new bureaucratic state to police forces directly
subordinate to them, specifically the regulation of commerce and industry, European rulers
were able to enhance their authority. Unlike a democracy, the monarch, not the people,
determined what was necessary for the citizen's welfare.
As the empires of Britain and France collapsed, some European states moved
toward a more decentralized form of state power. Today, police operations in Western
Europe draw their powers and authority from the central government, but are
decentralized to the extent that they often receive direct input from the citizens of the state
to varying degrees. "The legacy of absolutist policing remains evident in the centralized
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and hierarchical nature of western European police forces, but the range of police
functions has been reduced and their accountability to the citizenry increased." Thus
while remaining centralized, these forces no longer are militarized and are responsive to
the will of the populace rather than to a hierarchical authority.
2. Combined Model
To maintain order and their interests in colonized lands, European empires
instituted a varied form of policing. The new colonial police derived their authority from
both the central government and various local colonial leaders. Thus, colonial police were
less centralized and, unlike their continental counterparts, not a militarized force. They
retained authority from the state and held the monopoly on policing until the middle 20th
century when private security agencies began to take hold. This form of police were more
focused on protecting the property of the state and maintaining political and social order,
than on preventing and detecting crime. Because all threats to political order were in
essence a threat to the power of the imperial state, law enforcement in the colonized area
was highly politicized. Thus a method of combined authority both to the central
government and various local governmental bodies was instituted.
The American colonists made every effort to rid themselves of the police methods
tied to the politics of the king. The new thinking of American colonists was strongly
influence by such philosophers of the French Enlightenment as Baron Charles Louis de
Montesquieu. They attempted to create a democratic legal system which stressed the
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importance of local self-government and was devoid of the political controls that the
absolutist state used to maintain power.
22
"From its inception, therefore, the decentralized
institution of the American police was in structure and function fundamentally different
from the continental and colonial police model adopted by Russian and subsequently, by
the Soviet Union."" The collapse of most of the world's colonies has resulted in this
model of police operations to be greatly reduced. However, many multiethnic states still
struggling with the idea of democracy have found this method of policing in regions of
ethnic tension to ensure the stability of the state.
3. Decentralized Model
The American desire to escape the European political police state, resulted in the
formation of a police force with legitimacy in the local government and based solely upon
the laws of the individual state and nation. The collapse of the great European Empires
found the formation of a new enlightened method of police operations. 24 The American
model of police is decentralized and places the focus of operations in crime control and the
maintenance of order as their priority. Thus, early Anglo-Saxon police became
subservient to the rule of law. The primary focus of the democratic government was
justice as the end objective. This required a commitment to the citizens and the law.
" The Encyclopedia ofPolice Science. 487.
^ Shelley, Policing the Soviet Society: Evolution ofState Control. 5.
24 The eventual collapse of the British and French empire after World War I has furthered idea from late
1800 s to move police operations toward a more professional civic minded arm of the political
establishment to maintain order as societv became more liberalized
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"Rule ofLaw depends on consent, consent which in its most reliable form becomes habit.
The habit of consenting to obey the law."25
From the historical concepts, one can draw three principal styles of police
authority. The first, continental policing, is mostly a coercive police. One which in the
1690's was used to enforce the conversion to the Roman Catholic religion in Spain.
Spain's present special police force, the Guardia Civil, can still be classified in this manner
due to the threat presented by the Basque terrorist group Euskadi to Askatasuna, or ETA.
The threat presented by ETA, which stands for Basque Homeland and Freedom, requires
Spain's police operations to remain highly centralized and militarized. The second,
combined policing, can be described as a method to safeguard state interest and property.
This style was mostly used by 18th century despots to control and maintain their empires
and can still be associated to the method used in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. At
present, there are 43 police forces which are controlled by not only a chief police
executive but also a home secretary. 26 The home secretary is a senior member of the
British cabinet. The third, decentralized policing, is a form of self policing in which there is
a willing acceptance of police rule by the community that understands and endorses its
missions. Both combined and decentralized models are the methods of policing most
associated with the modern democratic policing. 27
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C. BUILDING DEMOCRATIC POLICE
With the collapse of many totalitarian regimes in the last two decades, there has
been a rise in new democratic states throughout the world. Along with the more supra-
national world order created by the United Nations, there has also been a rise in
international assistance to foster individual rights. This has resulted in the international
community becoming more involved in assisting states to establish democratic police
operations to reinforce state legitimacy. From Latin America to Eastern Europe, the
United Nations has been providing essential guidance and training to help transitioning
police forces. The International Police Task Force Commissioner in Bosnia, Mr. Thomas
Peter Fitzgerald, clearly outlined the goals and foundations for a transition to a democratic
police force. He outlined what is accepted as the International Standards for Policing in a
Democratic State. The transition, he stresses, begins with the basic foundation of the rule
of law. All police are in the act of public service and responsible to laws, not to the whim
of political leaders or particular party platforms. Specifically in Bosnia, he said that the
police functions must be "limited to those provided in the Constitution and Law on
Ministry of Internal Affairs."28
Police must ensure the application of seven basic principles that guide all
democratic policing. The standards Mr. Fitzgerald and the international police community
identified are:
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1) The orientation to democratic principles;
2) The adherence to a code of conduct worthy ofthe public trust;
3) The protection and safety of life;
4) Public service;
5) A central focus on crimes against people and property;
6) The respect for human dignity;
7) Non-discrimination.
29
These principles imply a standardized set of behaviors that must be trained and enforced.
The transition to democratic policing also includes: a requirement not to perform military
or secret police functions; training on the Constitution, criminal code and professional
standards; a requirement for all operations to be governed by law and written policy; and
methods for investigation of misconduct. 30 The major obstacle for transition lies in the
fact that these democratic ideals of public service are fundamentally at odds with the
repressive styles of police operations that often become standard in totalitarian states.
With this repression comes a lack of professional police conduct as police officers are
guided by the ideal of state control and survivability, not the rights of individual citizens




Specifically, democratic police must not be used in conducting armed operations against the citizens of
the nation or in support of armed combat as the Stalin did in the 1930's and 40's. They also must not
operate under secrecy, where police can apprehend citizens in their homes at night with no judical review
or approval. Ibid, 5.
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the difficulty in the initial education and re-orientation of those providing the education for
officers at the police academies and at all levels of police education.
1. Professionalism
In 1829, with the introduction of the London metropolitan police came a call to
document rules regarding police and a standard of conduct to be followed. As noted by
legal scholar Jerome Skolnick, "there is a large body of rules defining crimes and the
punishments of those who commit them, rights and the remedies of those who are
wronged, but there is also a body of rules defining how and by whom, when and where,
rules of the former kind can be put into force."
31
This idea of rules for those enforcing the
laws of the state promulgates the idea of professionalism in which police must have a
sense of ethics and commitment to community service. This stature of police service as an
honored profession requires police to be highly trained, honest and capable. In fact, the
origins ofmodern policing are commonly agreed to be found in the teachings of Sir Robert
Peel over a century and half ago. He conducted extensive research into the need for
public order, more specifically, a professional police force in London. Reviewing statistics
from London and Middlesex, he argued that crime was dramatically increasing in the
period of the industrial revolution and the military was inherently untrained to deal with
the riots, prostitution and drunkenness that was rampant. 32 Peel was a strong proponent
of a professional police force versus the use of the army throughout the city. He was
31
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"confident they would be able to dispense with the necessity of a military force in London
for the preservation of the tranquillity of the metropolis."
33
Peel's work was followed by
the formation ofthe International Association of Chiefs ofPolice in 1893."
4
This
Association provided for the first nationwide voice for reform and professionalism in
policing to instill a set ofvalues for police officers to ensure individual freedoms and the
interest ofthe state are protected with legitimacy.
Value conflicts of a democratic society and police sometimes clash with the rule of
law. Police in a democratic society are required to maintain order and to do so under the
rule of law. As functionaries charged with maintaining order, they are part ofthe
bureaucracy. Yet, the ideology of a democratic bureaucracy emphasizes initiative rather
than disciplined adherence to rules and regulations. Police and the state must find the
right balance between freedom and order. To protect the rights ofthe many while holding
true to the right ofthe individual, is often difficult.
By contrast, the rule oflaw emphasizes the rights of individual citizens and
constraints upon the initiative of legal officials. This tension between the
operational consequences of ideas of order, efficiency, and initiative, on the
one hand, and legality, on the other, constitutes the principal problem of
police as a democratic legal organization.
35
In short, law and order are frequently found to be in direct opposition with one another.
Adherence to law implies a rational restraint upon the rules and procedures utilized to
"Skolnict, 2
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achieve order. This in turn limits the overall efficiency of maintaining order. Societal
order under law, therefore, subordinates the ideal of conformity to the ideal of legality. 36
The idea of this balance was a focus of England's 1962 Royal Commission on
Police. The Royal Commission was the first official body to undertake a careful appraisal
of this issue and became the standard for police in both Great Britain and the United
States. David Bayley, a noted police scholar and Professor of Criminal Justice at
Berkeley, referred to the conclusions of the Commission when analyzing the formation of
police operations in India. "It saw the need not only to examine the traditional problems
of administrative structure, recruitment, accountability, and conditions of service but the
need to examine public perceptions of police activity and the policeman's perceptions of
himself and his relations with the community.'" 7 In 1962, the Commission found that the
balance between enforcing the law and at the same time being accountable to that law is
essential to legitimate police operations.
The police systems in England, Scotland, and Wales are the
products of a series of compromises between conflicting principles
or ideas. Consequently, in contrast to other public services such as
health and education, the rationale of the police service does not
rest upon any single and definite concept of public good. Thus, it is
to the public good that the police should be strong and effective in
preserving law and order and preventing crime; but is equally to the
public good that police power should be controlled and confined so
as not to interfere arbitrarily with personal freedom. The result is
the compromise. The police should be powerful but not
oppressive; they should be efficient but not officious; they should
form an impartial force in the body politic, and yet be subject to a
37
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degree of control by persons who are not required to be impartial
38
and who are themselves liable to police supervision.
The requirement was identified that to maintain a true dedication to the rule of law, police
must be committed to identifying, investigating and eliminating those within the police
profession that failed to obey the very rule of law they pledged to uphold. This presents
one of the most difficult tasks for the transition of a police force from an authoritarian
regime to a police force operating in a democracy. 'The police reformer's problem is to
reduce gross brutality, which seems to have traditionally been associated with
,,39
corruption.
This idea is echoed in one of the three elements of professionalism as defined by
Samuel Huntington in 1957. In his description of 'corporateness,' Huntington identifies a
professional commitment that the group enforces upon its members. "This collective
sense has its origins in the lengthy discipline and training necessary for professional
competence, the common bond ofwork, and the sharing of a unique social
responsibility."
40
This collective sense enforces standards upon all those who enter the
profession in order to maintain the interest and status of the profession. This dedication to
maintain standards of conduct lead to a heightened sense of respect and trust by the






Huntington identifies three characteristics of a profession, expertise, responsibility and corporateness.
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It is the police officer, who is the lowest level ofgovernment which interacts with
the community daily, that is challenged with closing the gap that often develops in a
society between those who enforce the law and those against whom it is enforced. This is
especially important where the rule of law is a new idea. In this situation, it is essential
that the police demonstrate their common humanity with the citizens of the state. 41 The
ideal of professionalism can be noted in all seven of the basic principles specified by the
international police community. Number two, the adherence to a code of conduct worthy
of public trust highlights the critical link between police conduct and the perceptions
generated in the public eye.
Police efforts to strengthen their professional conduct must focus on training. The
idea of a well-trained police force is not new. In both Continental Europe and England,
extensive training programs for police officers have existed for quite some time.
Professionally oriented training programs also even serve as an inducement in police
recruiting, influencing a more socially oriented individual. George Brerton noted in
Europe, that when an officer is promoted by means of acknowledgment of their ability to
master their profession, they become dedicated to the field. "These men make a career of
the police service and are promoted through the various ranks and sometimes are
promoted from a small city to a large city as opportunities are presented and their abilities
are recognized."42 Brerton further identified the move in 1923 by August Vollmer, a well-
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known American police chief, to stress several recommendations intended to raise
standards and improve police departments in the United States. Vollmer's suggestions
were to:
1) Establish and maintain higher standards of education, mental, moral, and
physical requirements for applicants;
2) Provide observation of all recruits by a physician-psychologist during their
training period;
3) Withhold full police authority from the recruit until he is judged fit to discharge
the duties of his position;
4) Establish preparatory and promotional courses for policemen in colleges and
universities;
5) Establish crime prevention divisions and appoint trained criminologists to
conduct activities of the division;
6) Establish a merit system in police departments;
7) Educate the public and secure its friendship and cooperation with the police
department.
4j
All of these training requirements and administrative procedures go directly toward
developing a professional police force. By 1937, the International Association of Chiefs
of Police created a committee on the Professionalization of Police services that monitors





and makes recommendations on continued standards of conduct, training requirements
and code of ethics for police enforcement officers in the United States. 44
2. Police Restraint
A democratic society places constraints upon those who are granted the right to
invoke the processes of punishment in the name of law. Rules must be drafted clearly,
stated concisely, and carried out with regularity and fairness. "Authorities are servants of
the people, not a 'vanguard' of elites instructing the masses. The overriding value must be
the consent of the governed. From it derives the principle of the accountability of
authority, accountability primarily to courts of law and ultimately to a democratically
constituted legislature based upon universal suffrage."^ To think of democratic police as
founded on a consensus between the police and the public is paradoxical. The need for
police only becomes necessary when, at some point, the consensus to obey the law is
broken.
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The organizational model of the police also influences their conception of order.
To the degree that police are organized in a military model, there is also likely to be
generated an authoritarian idea of order. Police structured and trained in areas of combat
similar to a military force can tend to lean toward the arbitrary use of authority to achieve
what they perceive to be the aims of the law. The officer and organization
,
while








discretionary use of force to maintain order. As during a state of martial law, crime
control is elevated to a position where it is valued more than the principle of accountability
to the rule of law. At all other times, however, civil liberties and freedom must be
balanced with the maintenance of order, with supremacy going to individual rights. This
requires police officers with an inherent ability to exercise discretion when necessary.
Skolnick argues that "in the abstract, rule of law embodies rational restraints upon
authority as it defines criminal conduct."
47
This requires the application of civil liberties
and individual rights that ensure state authority is not exercised arbitrarily outside of
established laws. ' The idea of operational law enforcement should suggest both the
attitudes and behavior of policemen responding to judicial rulings, and interpersonal
relations with the accused, the prosecutor, defense attorney, judge, and whenever
applicable, with the general public."
48
This separation is necessary to enhance the
professionalism and ethical conduct of the police. Professionalism and ethical conduct
begin in the education of police officers.
Professional modern police must operate on a legal basis and arrest suspects solely
on objective evidence. This requires specific training on the rights of individuals accused
of violation ofthe law. Law enforcement must be focused to regulate behavior of
individuals rather than a collective group in a democratic society. This is necessary as
police must enforce specific violations and cannot arrest the whole for actions of one.






force required to conduct an apprehension, is paramount to ensuring human rights. It is
essential that a professional police officer apply no more physical coercion than is
necessary in any given situation. The use of excessive force to render a suspect under
arrest or even more extreme, the use of fear to exact confessions, is unacceptable to the
basic idea of individual rights and the rule of law. Standardized training programs are
designed and implemented to ensure only the minimum force necessary is used
consistently.
49
Often constraint is not seen as an effective mechanism when a government is
encountering problems in establishing order in the society. Often in this situation human
rights and individual freedoms are compromised for the greater good of order in the
society. This can be taken to the extreme however, and used to mold the society into
something undesirable. Many Soviets continued to follow Marxism in spite of clear
evidence that oppression was not only an excess of Stalin, but was and is an integral
component of the system of communism. No one made this more clear than Aleksandr
Solzhenitsyn in The Gulag Archipelago. He takes great pains to point out that the
foundations of lawless expediency, the willingness to ensure internal security at any cost
which were firmly established from the beginning ofthe Communist state. After
summarizing the trials up through 1 922 and looking ahead to the famous showcase trials,
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Solzhenitsyn asks, "What, then, were they surprised at in 1937? Hadn't all the
foundations of lawlessness been laid."
Solzhenitsyn goes further to write, "From the most ancient times justice has been a
two-part concept: virtue triumphs and vice is punished.' In contrast, he concludes that in
Russia, 'Young people are acquiring the conviction that foul deeds are never punished on
earth, that they always bring prosperity."
51
Accountability and impartiality are absolutely
required in order to ensure any justice system maintains its legitimacy on its own footing.
It is clear that both Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and more recent legal political leaders find this
element absent in the Soviet and post-Soviet Russia.
In a democracy the relation between the police and the politicians is conditioned by
the need to ensure the efficiency and impartiality of the agency, on the one hand, and its
responsibility and accountability to the people, on the other. Efficient administration
without responsibility is incompatible with the principles of democracy; and accountability
without efficiency calls into question the whole purpose of government. The role of the
policeman is not an easy one. While one must bear a responsibility for the reputation he
acquires, it must be kept in mind that controversy and emotion are undeniable elements of
law enforcement. The police must act with restraint in society's name, using skills of
persuasion, and sometimes force, to entice individuals to conform to the society's rule.
It is this balance that must be trained and developed in Russia today. If used properly,
50
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police can be a foundation for which democracy can be consolidated in a transitioning
society as it serves to be the basis of the rule of law.
D. INTERNATIONAL TRAINING AND COOPERATION
David Bayley finds that in developing governments, "leaders inside and outside
the police must become accustomed to examining the opportunities for democratic
tutelage that are contained in the police role. Standing proudly on accountability under
law and neutrality in politics, they must play a creative role, that perhaps no other agency
ofgovernment is so critically placed to assume in a developing democracy."5^ This is an
area where the international police community has made efforts to provide assistance
programs world wide to introduce and teach new concepts of policing. These concepts
include respect for human rights, dignity, integrity, accountability and professional
competence, and enhance the seven basic principles of democratic policing. The transition
to democratic police practices requires a re-focusing of the basic use of police, from
protectors of state control to protectors of public safety. Several agencies in the United





1. Hiring and Training Standards
According to the International Association of Directors ofLaw Enforcement
Standards and Training, a fundamental emphasis of law enforcement educational
curriculum should consist of clearly identifiable performance objectives for standards of
conduct. This must be supplemented with a field training program incorporating on-the-
job training in order to conduct job performance analysis. Field training must cover:
knowledge and skills unique to the law enforcement agency; knowledge of particular skills
that are determined to be essential to the occupation; and demonstration of proficiency in
the established performance objectives. All must be completed with satisfactory
evaluation prior to the officer being certified.
54
Entry standards are designed to ensure
graduates will meet as closely as possible a minimum of professional standard as adopted
by the state.
Today, the international training mission of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) is "to secure and advance the strategic and operational interests of the FBI in a
training context."
55
While the initial goals are related to enhancing the efforts of solving
crime in the United States, it is realized that a successful democratic transition is critical to
furthering efforts to curb crime transcending international borders. Current training and
assistance includes police ethics training and methods of establishing a viable method of
hiring the right people to enhance and promote professional police operations.
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Special Agent Byrd, FBI Chief of the International Cooperation Unit, has found in
the last three years, that some of the concepts related to conducting law enforcement
operations under the rule of law are beyond Russian society's understanding due to their
historical background. He does note however, that the mid-level managers, who are the
focus of the international training efforts, are eager and grasp these concepts quickly. The
areas of focus for the FBI's training have centered upon assisting the Russia Ministry of
the Interior to develop an infrastructure and the institutions to enhance their commitment
to ethics and professionalism. The areas of specific emphasis are the recruitment of
personnel, the methods of certifying training and the internal controls to enforce
professional standards. The FBI's training program focuses on maximizing the number
of officers trained either at the International Law Enforcement Academy in Budapest,
Hungary, or with mobile training teams sent to Russia several times each year; and
Russian police managers attending the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia. All ofthese
efforts are designed to develop a community policing approach that will also impact
positively on the cynical elements of the Russian society toward law enforcement. "The
International efforts since 1994 have already reaped significant benefits. To date, we have
made 12 arrests in cases that have organizational crime connections and impact on both







Democratic police can not be trained to obey the rule of law in a vacuum. As
noted by Special Agent Byrd, there are elements of civil society that do not have a
practical understanding of civic responsibility. This is due to the Russian society's general
distrust of everything related to government. To counter this in the Russian society, the
United States Information Agency (USIA) has developed a civics education program
designed to educate and broaden the public service attitude of the former Communist
society. Centuries of corruption and totalitarian abuses have resulted in a culture that
places extreme distrust on anything government and specifically police oriented. Without
a basic general trust of police enforcement agencies and the government as a whole, the
governmental institutions can not further develop the professional attitudes of its
employees, who are products of that society.
USIA grants have also supported civics education workshops for school
administrators. In the fall of 1996, 31 Russian school administrators from eighteen
regions of the country participated in a USIA- funded, five day workshop near Nizhniy
Novgorod. 58 The American Federation of Teachers, in consultation with USIA in
Moscow, organized the workshop, which provided an opportunity for school
administrators from each different region to learn about developments in the field of civics
education elsewhere in the country.
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This program is designed to strengthen and encourage the growth of tolerant
democracies and civil societies. 'Tor more than seven years, civic education programs
have been at the heart of USIA's democratization programs and have played a strategic
role in strengthening democratic norms and values among young people preparing for the
future as responsible and well-informed citizens of the new democracy."39
The rule of law and the governmental approach to police operations are a critical
element of domestic security in any democratic society. While maintaining more
individual freedoms and political stability, democratic societies tend to develop greater
incidents of crime than those of a totalitarian police state. The methods and approach the
new democratic government uses to maintain internal stability and to curb this increase in
crime is a cornerstone in the foundation as the nation transitions toward democracy.
Together with a civic minded society and a rule of law oriented police, democracy
can develop as the transitional state finds the balance between liberty and order. "Respect
for law is an essential ingredient for democracy; for the police to try to operate
autonomously, without consideration for the desires of the people, would cheapen the law
and encourage the public to make common cause with the law breakers against the law."60
The democratic transition of Russian police operations requires introducing and
teaching new concepts of policing that include respect for human rights, dignity, integrity,
accountability, and professional competence. Stated more simply, a police force can
directly affect the political system ofthe state and society by virtue ofhow it interacts with
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the community, the methods it uses to enforce the laws of the state, and how it deals with
its personnel when the standards are violated. The rule of law approach to police
operations is a critical element of domestic security in any democratic society and requires
the fundamental driving force to be professionalism and adherence to the laws of the state.
It is this very issue that makes Russia's transition to democratic police operations and the
rule of law most difficult. The seventy years of Communist police state tactics have
severed to hinder this understanding in Russian society.
III. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE RUSSIAN/SOVIET POLICE
STRUCTURE
The evolution of the Soviet police and methods of law enforcement in the decades
of Soviet rule reflected the Soviet state's ideology. A crucial relationship developed
between the Communist party and the people where the Party would control and direct
each Soviet citizen's life. This relationship would establish the pattern of law enforcement
that characterized the repressive nature of Soviet police operations throughout Communist
rule and into its collapse. Thus, the legacy of Soviet police operations presents one of the
critical challenges to the success of the Russian transition to democracy. The cornerstone
of these challenges is the fundamental approach the state takes toward the rule of law.
This chapter will provides a brief historical view of the Russian and Soviet attitude toward
the rule of law and the traditions of policing. In doing so, the chapter will also highlight
the futile attempts made at reform by Soviet leaders prior to 1991
.
A. SOVIET CONCEPT OF RULE OF LAW AND SOCIETY
As was discussed in Chapter II, the development of a democratic police is rooted
in a dedication to a rule of law and an essential contract between the society and the police
who enforce the laws. This premise creates a challenge for Communist transitions to
democracy that are founded on oppressive police operations. From the earliest use of
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police in Russia, there was no apparent expectation in the society that officials or state
institutions would adhere to the laws. Additionally, there were no enforcement
mechanisms to ensure compliance with protecting legal rights granted to the citizens. This
was due to the constant altering of laws to meet the needs of the state. Beginning with the
tsarist police, the Russian use of police to control society riddled the rule of law with a
dilemma of poorly educated and corrupt police officials. While the Soviet state
established a legal framework under the Soviet Constitution, rights were not clear. This
allowed for the abuse of the legal system with laws and regulations published 'Tor Official
Use Only." These laws were classified and the individual citizens were at the mercy of the
Party and police. 61 While all laws pertaining to criminal conduct were published, those
that encompassed life once part of the system ofjustice were not. The most significant
was the "Statute on the Militsiia" which guided police in the incarceration and
interrogation of criminals ofthe state. Thus, the guiding principles that the police
followed in the treatment, questioning and application of the law were not made known to
even the prisoner himself. In the Soviet society, the quality of law enforcement was only
further degraded and eroded due to the lack of any system of checks on the entire justice
system. In the words ofLord Acton, "power tends to corrupt and absolute power
corrupts absolutely." Due to the extreme centralization of the Soviet system, especially
during the Stalinist years, the police structure was almost completely free to act in secrecy
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and went unchecked except by the leadership of the state. This led to the abuses of power
by Joseph Stalin and others to ensure the life of the state by providing the police
overwhelming authority in investigations and prisons.
1. Shaping Soviet Society
Beginning with the Bolshevik formation of the Vecheka, more commonly referred
to as the Cheka in 1918, Soviet autocratic police authority was an essential component of
the state control of society. It established a tradition of sweeping police power, brutal
investigative techniques, massive use of labor camps, and long sentences for control of
ordinary citizens.
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This is in direct contrast to the rule of law forms of police operations
adopted in the West. "In a rechtsstaat, knowledge of and access to the law are essential in
order that the citizenry can hold the state accountable to its own laws. Such a situation
did not prevail in the USSR, where Soviet officials enhanced their power by enacting laws
known only to law enforcement bodies."*" The most significant example of this is the
administrative laws which provided the rights of prisoners and the accused. By restricting
access to these administrative laws, the Soviet state was able to maintain a definite
advantage over citizens apprehended for crimes. This method of secretive state controlled
operations began a long tradition of manipulation of the police to meet the ideological
needs of the state. They instilled a perpetual distrust by the citizens of all police officials.
Laws enforced by the Soviet police thus became the foundation of the "administrative
3





command system," making all Soviet subjects subordinate to the unknown and
overarching authority of the state. 64 This system allowed the regime to make the
enforcement of laws and judicial procedures more expedient and can be seen as one of the
most evident signs of non-democratic law enforcement traditions. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn
describes the system best:
It would have been impossible to carry out this hygienic purging, especially
under wartime conditions, if they had had to follow outdated legal
processes and normal judicial procedures. And so an entirely new form
was adopted: extra-judicial reprisal, and this thankless job was self-
sacrificingly assumed by the Cheka, the Sentinel of the Revolution, which
was the only punitive organ in human history that combined in one set of
hands investigation, arrest, interrogation, prosecution, trial and execution
of the verdict. 65
The hygienic purging that Solzhenitsyn is referring to is the elimination of threats to the
ideology of the state by placing authority for all the elements of the system ofjustice in the
hands of the police. This created a body capable of fabricating evidence, extracting
confessions through coercion and the sentencing of offenders. While this system was most
prevalent prior to 1953, the traditions of police authority and secrecy remained largely
until 1991.
2. Soviet Criminal Law
Deep within the Russian tradition is the idea that the law plays the role of teacher
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Socialism. Its development has accompanied the increasing centralization of power in
many industrial countries. "The Soviet Union has probably gone further than any country,
however, in focusing on the role of law as a teacher and parent. Soviet law thus
challenges us to examine the potentialities and dangers inherent in parental law."
6 The
illusion was that the Russian people through some innate sense of truth would find a
superior form of social life to that provided by any external legal order. "The Russian
intelligentsia both before the Revolution and since failed, for the most part, to acquire any
real sense of the importance of law and legal order. "
67
This trust is most evident in the Russian word pravo which means Law in the
larger sense, more correctly right or justice. Russian also has a word for a particular law
or statue, zakon. As Harold Berman points out: "In Russian the word Law, pravo, is
related to the word truth, pravda. This may derive from an older conception that Law is
revelation, that it is ordained by nature itself"68 Relying on this tradition, the Russian
people paid a high price for the trust and belief that the administration of the law could
safely be left to the dictates of the Russian soul and the judgment ofthe state authorities.
This belief in the Russian soul and judgment of state authorities has led directly to the
police oppressions of the Tsarist period and to the vast police repression of the Soviet
69
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A detailed examination of Soviet law is neither practical nor necessary to examine
the fundamental issues involved in the Soviet model of law enforcement. What is critical
however, is what Louise Shelley points to; that Soviet criminal law, while published, was
not reproduced in sufficient numbers to be accessed by the legal community or the general
population. This on the surface appears to show an attempt at honesty toward the laws of
the state. In reality, many operational laws (those affecting citizens upon arrest) were
classified as 'Tor Official Use Only." This coupled with the reality that the Criminal Code
was not published in sufficient numbers to be available created a law enforcement
environment of secrecy.
While all criminal and administrative laws that proscribed conduct were not held
secret, the publication of criminal and administrative law did not guarantee a citizen that
he would not be convicted of a crime he did not know existed. Ferri Feldbrugge argues
that the Soviets practiced "token observance, but at the same time circumvented by the
device of unpublished rules."70 Thus Shelley argues that Soviet law fell within the
guidelines of the Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights, "but in actual administration of
the law reflects the secrecy that is so pervasive in Soviet life."
71
This form of secret
lawmaking and maintaining was not unique to Stalin. The Sobranie published between
1973 and 1979 in sixty volumes, prepared by the Juridical Commission attached to the
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Council of Ministers and published by the USSR Ministry of Justice. 72 The Sobranie laid
the foundation for the Svod zakonov SSSR, the official law collection. The Svod includes
1,300 federal acts, including many consolidations and codification's of pre-existing
statues. "A substantial portion ofthe statues included in the Sobranie cannot be found in
the Svod, but continue to be in effect."' ' Under Stalin's successors there was a continued
use of closely held and unpublished administrative laws. This helped official law
enforcement and justice to retain their hold on judicial procedures from start to finish,
especially in criminal cases.
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The impact of such extensive secret law made the individual powerless in the hands
of the state. Even if the criminal law is known, the principles of the rule of law are not
upheld ifthe individual cannot know when he is crossing the state's limits or how his case
will be processed through the justice system. 75 "The Sobranie represents a legal challenge
because it includes acts which affect the rights and duties of citizens but is not accessible
to the public."
76
It was initially published and distributed to a limited circle of users during
the Brezhenv years. Having a set of laws that are restricted to the knowledge of only
2 The Sobranie is a compilation of All-Union acts having 'normative significance.' This concept has not
been legally defined, but Soviet legal scholars generally agree that the term includes acts regulating the
behavior of men ~ that is. affecting the rights and duties of citizens and other subjects of law. Shelley,
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certain agencies is the very contradiction to the rule of law and democracy. The right to
know the law has been a fundamental element of the rule of law in Western legal thought.
Individuals cannot be excused for failing to know the law, but they have a basic right to
know what can and cannot be done in society. "The rule of law presumes a certain
rationality to human behavior. It assumes that individuals calculate the costs of their
behavior, but if they cannot know the full legal consequences of their behavior, they
cannot make rational decisions. Thus, while secret law may serve the larger state control
77
objectives, it may be counterproductive in the individual case."
Secret legislation concerning police operations fell into four main categories.
These categories include the right and responsibilities of the law enforcement apparatus;
the career patterns of individuals employed; the decisions made concerning the initiation of
cases; and the division of responsibility among branches of the law enforcement
apparatus.
78
This extensive area of secret laws has been a part of the Soviet Union for
many decades and is a reality of the administrative command system used to control the
economy and Soviet life. The secrecy of such laws clouds the faith and confidence of
society in the law enforcement of the state. The citizen's inability to understand the rules
and decisions made ensured the state's control. This enhanced state authority as the
individual citizen was unaware ofthe law enforcement personnel's responsibilities and the
vast scope of that authority.
77




Combined with this was the overwhelming influence of the Party in all aspects of
the Soviet justice system. The approximately 16,000 Soviet judges were formally
'independent and subordinate to the law' according to Article 155 of the 1977
Constitution. "In practice the rule of 'telephone law'— local party and governmental
pressures ~ widely superseded the rule of constitutional and statute law." Thus the
Soviet system contained a basic contradiction between the independence ofjudges and
their political subordination as long as the Communist Party retained its vanguard role,
under Article 6, of 'guiding and directing force.'
3. Unique Development of a Model
The Continental or militarized police model served to provide an initial basis for
the structure and operational procedures of the Soviet police. However, the level of state
mandated authority went well beyond that in place in western Europe.
Rooted in both the continental and colonial traditions, Communist policing
nevertheless represented a unique type of policing whose scope and
authority far exceeds that of earlier historical models. In contrast to these
police models, the Soviet militia represented and enforced conformity with
a state ideology that proscribed a wide range ofhuman activity and justified
a single party's monopoly of power. 80
Law in the Soviet Union functioned to reinforce the power of the Communist
party, not to grant rights to citizens. This tradition was acquired from the Russian tsars.
They had developed centralized police forces in order to maintain their power over
ethnically diverse populations spread over large geographical areas. The tsars used
79
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colonial methods of policing to regulate order in the frontier regions of the Russian
empire. As David Bayley describes, the Soviet system was developed out of the precedent
set by Tsar Nicholas I in 1826. This system, which included the Third Section known as
the first Russian secret police, was designed to ensure police functions were directly tied
to the Tsar's personal staff.
81
This force however was more centralized than those used
by western European empires. The centralized system functioned to maintain the
authority of the central Russian government.
The Soviet government carried on this tradition of colonial police operations
unlike other European empires in the 19th century. For instances, the British empire used
a colonial police force only in detached colonies. The Soviets on the other hand, used it in
their homeland. "The blending of continental and colonial police functions in the USSR
permitted a hierarchical, centralized police system to execute orders through a vast
territory populated by numerous- and diverse- ethnic groups."
: Through the use of both
the continental and colonial police methods, the Soviet state was able to increasingly use
police in an attempt to model the ideal Soviet man. As citizens failed to conform to the
ideology, increasingly, the police became the system to ensure conformity. One of the
best methods to ensure this conformity became the use of confessions to reaffirm the
state's legitimacy. Robert Conquest describes the extensively used means of obtaining
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such confessions in his work The Great Terror: A Reassessment. He details the use of the
"conveyor" method of interrogation used extensively by the NKVD in the 1930's.
When we read, in cases of no particular importance, and areas ones never
made to be public, of the use of the 'conveyor' system, tying down teams
of investigators for days on end, the impression one gets is not simply of
vicious cruelty, but insane preoccupation with pointless formality.
8 ~'
Conquest highlights the insanity of the Soviet legal system. One that went to great lengths
to exhaust extensive man hours in order obtain a confession instead of evidence to
maintain control rather than law and order within the society. This contorted system
within the law enforcement process furthered the state's hold on the people and was used
to ensure the security ofCommunism. "Behavior that transgressed prescribed ideological
norms was perceived as threatening the state; a great number of areas of life thus became
criminalized and, consequently, subject to police authority."
The Soviet model of police operations was also greatly influenced by the
nomenklatura system. This system of Communist Party control of specific positions to be
filled by approved Party members resulted in the major law enforcement positions in all
republics being filled specifically by the Party leadership. This ensured compliance to the
ideology and enhanced Slavic domination in ethnic regions. "Colonialism in the USSR
had two distinct components, one ideological and one nationalistic: colonial police in the
Soviet Union enforced both Marxist ideology and Great Russian dominance."8 This often
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led to the dissolution of traditional republic laws and an increase in corruption as police
leaders were not closely tied to the ideals of the society they were policing. "Soviet
policing can be characterized as colonial not because the police imposed alien legal norms
on foreign populations, but became police leadership on the republic level followed a
Sift
conscious personnel policy that favored Slavs."
Contrary to states in the West, the Soviet state failed to democratize their police
force as the state underwent forced industrialization and urbanization. Thus, the police
became a central component of the Party's power over the state and ability to enforce its
economic policies. "With the Soviet militia assigned to control citizen mobility, crime,
sanitation, markets and political activity- not to mention registration of printing presses
and typewriters- virtually all citizen activity fell within the legitimate purview of the
police."
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This vast-range of police functions enabled the Communist Party to maintain a
monopoly of political and economic power and to control all aspects of Soviet life, most
specifically cultural and religious. The Communist state fundamentally denied the
Enlightenment idea that the state represents the will of the people. Instead, it believed it
was the role of the vanguard to mold the citizens in order to create the true socialist
society. Hence, the Soviet state depended on the police and the threat of criminal law to
induce conformity to the Communist ideology. The Soviet perpetuation of the use of







The Soviets relied upon three distinct principles in their operating methodology
that greatly contributed to the state's ability to maintain control of such a diverse and large
empire. These principles were:
1) Divide and Rule — police operations designed to divide the inhabitants into
suitable compartments for better control and manipulation. This method was used
extensively in the various ethnic republics to gain and maintain a Slavic Russian dominance
of the regions. The most extensive use was in the Central Caucasus regions where it was
necessary to deport large ethnic groups in an effort to maintain control of the region.
2) Fear of Police Secrecy — includes the act of police hiding the actual mechanism
of its power from the public view to exert control. This is best expressed in the use of
secret administrative regulations that were not revealed to the public. Soviet criminal law,
while published, failed to make public knowledge the administration law which "affects the
way the law is imposed, the legal proceedings, the offender's treatment in confinement,
and his destiny upon release."88 Thus a system was used to greatly control criminals and
dissidents or any who acts against the Soviet ideology by subjecting them to a world
where the rules of the game are classified.
3) Violence and Deceit — police often justified use of violence as a subterfuge
against disturbers of domestic public peace as for the greater good. This included acts of
inflicting physical punishment or its threat to influence behavior.
89
This method of the use
of force or threat of force to put down domestic rebellion can still be seen in the present




day Internal Troop formations. These troops, while considered police forces, are trained
in the use of military force and were used successfully during the collectivization period in
Soviet history.
B. EVOLUTION OF SOVIET POLICE
This system based upon law as the instrument for imposing a necessary social
order was applied quite differently throughout the life of the Communist State. Each
Soviet leader used the police in different forms but with the same goal: to maintain power.
This resulted in a perpetual pendulum swing with each Communist General Secretary
manipulating the police differently in order to achieve their individual idea of that
necessary social order.
Soon after the October 1917 revolution, the Bolsheviks found it necessary to
create a police force since the tsarist police were eliminated with all other tsarist
institutions. With initial notions of a free stateless society, the Bolsheviks had no idea that
what they would create would be a far more repressive police organization than any used
by the tsar. 90 With the realization that a force was needed for the maintenance of power
throughout the period of civil war that followed the Revolution, the Provisional
Government created the NKVD (People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs) on 7
90
Knight. Amy W. The KGB: Police and Politics in the Soviet Union. (Boston: Unwin Hyman. 1990).
10.
50
November 1917. 91 The actual organization of this new internal security body was not
complete however, until the summer of 1918. This new organization was a multi-
functional body with 1 1 different divisions and over 400 personnel to handle all internal
security issues of the new state. As such, the NKVD had the temporary authority to enact
and develop their own regulations which eventually took on a legislative connotation.
Initially, their priority was to liquidate any counter-revolutionary acts. One division, the
Cheka, quickly focused efforts as a political police with vast authority to delve into the
lives of all citizens.
J
Lenin, from his earliest years, was concerned with the efficiency of law
enforcement. Thus, the Soviet law enforcement emphasized positive results. The focus
became arrests and prosecution solve rates rather than application of established legal
procedures.
94
This is fundamentally at odds with western understanding of the rule-of-law
state. Martin Latsis, a high ranking Chekist official in 1921 described a system that
established the earliest traditions of corruption and disregard for a rule of law. "However
honest a man is, however crystal clear his heart, work in the Cheka, which is carried on
with almost unlimited rights and under conditions greatly affecting the nervous system,
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begins to tell. Few escape the effect of the conditions under which they
work... corruption, brutality, physical coercion...."
95
After attempts at popular police efforts, the Bolsheviks created a police force
based upon a system devised by the Provisional Government and the police organizations
that had formed at urban factories.
96 By April 1919, the police was militarized and
displayed a return to the continental police traditions as under the tsarist regime.
97
Initially, the newly formed police appeared to have a sensitive face. Officers were polite
and did not hound the public, but gradually they developed little tolerance for possible
offenders. This was a result of the fact that by 19 January 1921 almost one third of the
Soviet police were placed under the control of the military and sent to the front to fight in
the civil war. Those who returned distinguished in battle for the Soviet state, were
transferred to the secret police leaving a poor quality of police personnel in the post war
period. Adding to this degradation was the emerging policy of selection based upon
ideological concerns and class background verse individual qualifications. 98 In 1922, the
first pendulum swing began with all the divisions of the police being pulled together no-
longer under the military but the strongest NKVD division, the political police. 99 Crime
control seemed quickly to be subordinate to political functions. "Political domination of
policing, an issue of concern in many democratic societies, was intentionally
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institutionalized within the law enforcement structure." 100 With a merge of social and
political functions to fight ordinary crime and politically motivated banditry, the Soviets
used criminal law to institutionalize the socialist economic system.
With the death of Lenin, Stalin quickly found the police and political police useful
tools in accomplishing his goals of collectivization and industrialization. Not only were all
police forces used to confiscate peasant taxes, but they forced labor to build the large new
industrial complexes. The police were associated with the worst repression of the Stalinist
period. This is evidenced through the use of such methods as the Ukrainian Horse
Brigades ofthe Militia for the confiscation of grain and the rapid growth of the Gulag
system. "Police legitimacy in this period was not based on the Rule of Law, but on the
individual power of the supreme dictator." 101
During the Stalinist period, the NKVD appeared to be the antithesis of democratic
policing and its structure and activities were in line with the tenets of totalitarianism. In a
totalitarian society, subordinates are offered little opportunity to introduce new means of
achieving the goals of the organization. Subordination implies obedience not initiative.
Thus soon Stalin was able to use his NKVD, not as a subordinate to the Party, but to
control the Party. The NKVD had three leaders (Genrih Yagoda 1934-1936, Nicholai
Yezhov 1936-38, and Lavrentii Beria 1938-1945) between the four years of Stalin's worst
30




purges, 1934-1938. With Yagoda and Yezhov victims themselves of the purges, Beria,
became Minister of Interior from 1938-1945. After Stalin's death Beria' s loyalty to the
methods of Stalin would be evident as he made an attempt to merge the police divisions
with the other repressive state security organs.
10j
Stalin's leadership purges and increase
in the authority of the police are evidence of his insecurity and desire to maintain political
power, not his concern for the domestic security ofthe Soviet citizen. In the words of
David Bayley, iCBy implication, criminal insecurity does not impel police into politics; only
political insecurity does."
104
Stalin used an effective method of controlling all the police
elements and the Party by extensive use of torture, blackmail and falsification. As Robert
Conquest details, by doing so outside the police and Party apparatus first, he lulled them
into a false sense of security making his deep purges in both of these elements easier.
"Under a calm facade, there was furious activity. He [Stalin] had ready all the ingredients
which he was to bring together into the set pieces of the Great Purge."
Early in 1930, the idea to spread global revolution was reduced to a concentrated
effort to perfect the Socialist State in Russia. This required a more aggressive effort for
industrialization and collectivization, and as such immediate registration of all property
and citizenship.
106
Soviet police training in turn focused on identification of enemies of the
state, whom were more specifically peasants resisting State policies and collectivization.
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By 1932 a passport system had to be instituted to handle the flood of peasants fleeing
collectivization. By forbidding passports to peasants, the police was able to forcibly tie
the peasant to collective farms.
107
This system was in direct contradiction to Lenin's initial
ideas against a state system of control over the individual's movement. What developed
was successful police repression and hence a political conformity and low crime rates.
"The high degree of social order attained at that time is remembered nostalgically by many
people in the post-soviet state today."
108
In addition, Stalin's fear of German advances
and a desire to increase control of the population but not vest all police power in one
organization, he created yet another swing of the organizational control of the police. On
30 February 1941, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet ordered a split between the police
(NKVD) and the newly created NKGB (People's Commissariat of State Security). By
March 1946, both became full ministries, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and the
Ministry of State Security (MGB). 109
The police were not accountable to the citizens of the state, nor entirely to the
Party, but ultimately to Stalin. With the demise of the Party under the purges, the police
became a leading apparatus of the Stalinist state and essentially guardians of ideology.
Soon, the police destroyed all it should have normally upheld: law, morality, justice and
safety.
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1. Attempts at Less Authoritarian Police Methods
"As the terror of the Stalin years receded, citizens became complicit in their own
control, thereby sustaining police power and making duplicity the heart of the state-citizen
relationship."
110
This best describes the resistance that confronted any reforms attempted
by post Stalin Soviet leaders. With the complete manipulation of the legal process under
Stalin, the necessary lines between domestic law enforcement, intelligence and counter-
intelligence functions were blurred beyond recognition. Secretary Nikita Khruschev
attempted to reform the entire Soviet justice system between 1953-1963. His hope was to
reduce the scope of terror exercised by the KGB, professionalize criminal law
enforcement, and eliminate the excessively harsh punishments instituted by Stalin. In
1954, Secretary Khruschev made a permanent separation between the KGB and the
MVD.m This was an effort to eliminate the role of the intelligence arm of the state
security apparatus from participation in the law enforcement and judicial process.
Khruschev was determined to set the rules of the game for criminal acts and eliminate the
arbitrary arrests and application of force by the state security institutions. By 1956, he
was made the first attempts to decentralize Soviet police operations in order to focus
criminal efforts in each Republic. His initiatives included an increase in police salaries, and
reduction in administrative overhead, and a significant rise in the authority ofthe middle
110
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managers. However, the most significant reform act was the change in criminal statistical
counting in efforts to no longer falsify the counting of criminal incidents.
Despite his reforms, the basis of law enforcement operations remained founded on
the old combination of continental and communist police traditions. While Khruschev was
successful in increasing community involvement, a level of professionalism and an
observance of legal norms, police authority remained vested in the Party not the law or
constitution. This fact is clear in the writings oftwo scholars familiar with the Soviet
abuses of the rule of law. In the words of Leonard Schapiro:
Khrushchev and his associates seemed to have a genuine enough intention
to clean up the Augean stables of Stalinism in the realm of law as well as in
other fields. They were however, faced with a number of strong pressures
tempting them to disregard the law and resort to the old-fashioned
practices which we usually associate with the government of the USSR. 1
Robert Conquest concurs and highlights the lack of individual civil rights reform after the
abuses of Stalin.
However one looks at it, the penal and police systems were reformed in the
Khrushchev period. Equally, however, one looks at it, they did not
undergo essential change, did not become truly liberal. 114
MVD Minister Nikolai Stahanov, Minister of Internal Affairs from 1955 to 1961, tried to
emphasize crime control and enforcement of economic regulations as more important than
political duties in an effort to regain control of the police structure and operations. He
1
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made moves to rapidly alter the police attitude toward civil rights by giving the
administrative courts more authority. This created a greater distinction between criminal
offenses and those handled administratively. He failed however to meet the Party's goal
of eliminating crime in the Soviet state and was unable to resist the pressure to continue to
falsify crime statistics to do so. This raised serious concerns in the Central Committee of
the Communist Party, and by August 1960, Minister Stahanov received heavy criticism for
the democratic changes. Minister Stahanov was fired later in 1961 as a result.
115
Despite
these attempts, the Stalinist police leadership left behind an influence in the conduct of
police operations in society, institutional operations, and a total disregard for the rule of
law in the Soviet society.
116
2. Stifling of Democratic Reform
General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev made little attempt to continue police reforms.
During his tenure from 1964 to 1982, he was, however, able to push for more qualified
recruits with the primary role of police being to maintain social and economic order, and a
secondary role in appearing to assist the KGB in controlling dissidents. However,
Brezhnev made no attempt to remove the Party influence of the police and went even
further to corrupt the law enforcement structure. "Nepotism, string-pulling and servility,
which increasingly ousted Party principledness, entered our lives...Thus the number of
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untouchables, protected by highly-placed patrons increased." 117 One of the most obvious
ofthese was the placement of his son-in-law, Iurii Churbanov, as Deputy Minister of the
USSR MVD with no previous police experience. More significantly, Brezhnev re-
centralized the MVD and returned to continental police model, abandoning Khrushchev's
ideas of social order maintained without special police forces. He even went so far as to
expand law enforcement orientation by increasing police rights to administer penalties and
handle drunks. The police again became executors of Party policy and not professional
enforcers of the law. Brezhnev's patronage system led to police corruption that
undermined the policing authority ofthe Soviet state by producing a visual lack of
confidence in the police by the public.
General Secretary Iurii Andropov, noted for his efficiency and incorruptibility,
began the initial general clean up of police operations and the MVD. His efforts were
stalled later during the tenure of General Secretary Constantin Chernenko, but regained
energy again with Gorbachev and Yeltsin. In 1983, Andropov saw that 161,000 MVD
personnel were fired at all levels ofMVD hierarchy throughout USSR and that by 1986,
5% ofMVD and police had been dismissed. 118 This purge of corruption, however,
resulted in an infusion of a large quantity of Slavs to fill police vacancies in non-Slavic
republics. This created poor community relations in the regions due to the large number
of political organs influenced by the Central Committee that acted to prevent collaboration
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between the local party cells and the local MVD officials. According to present day
Russian Internal Troop Commander Colonel General Anatoliy Shkirko, there is a need to
use a police force loyal to the central government as there is reason to question the loyalty
of the local police forces is in question. He argues that there is and has been a problem
with the special local police sub-units, OMON (or special purpose police detachments) or
SOBR (Special rapid reaction detachments), which relates to the connection each has with
the local or regional leadership and that each is recruited from the local ethnic population
base.
119 From the mid 1980's to the fall of the Soviet State, this ethnic recruiting lead to
shortcomings in the execution of central orders. "As a rule, a certain part ofthe local
internal affairs organs are neither impartial nor independent in inter-ethnic and other
conflicts. This is precisely why in such conditions it is impossible to manage without a
federal force with its extraterritorial principle of manpower acquisition." 120
Thus Andropov began a watchdog system which provided the party a confidence
that centralized instructions were implemented and ensured the basic elements of
continental and communist policing were maintained. General Secretary Chernenko did
little to actually improve the police but did attempt to revitalize the public's view of it. He
ensured that "patrol posts were restructured in towns and cities in order to make the








"Leaving military intelligence aside, no fewer than 1 7 reorganizations took place
since the NKVD and Cheka were established in late 1917 until the collapse of the USSR in
late 1991." Throughout the first seventy years of communism, police operations were
used to impose an ideal social order that was corrupted by a false legitimacy derived from
the Party, or its leaders, and not the laws of the state. Each subsequent Soviet leader
applied an individual approach to policing the Soviet society in order to retain their
monopoly of power. This combined with the use of secret administrative laws contributed
to a lack of any form of allegiance to serving the society and developed a model of police
operations ripe for corruption. This model of police operations acquired a focus on
molding the behavior of society through fear and coercion, not providing a means of law
and order.
12




IV. DEMOCRATIC REFORMS OF MVD (1985 TO 1996)
The militia reforms desired by Mikhail Gorbachev far exceeded those attempted by
Yurii Andropov. Gorbachev's goal was to significantly reduce corruption and use the law
as a vital instrument of change in the Soviet society. He was expressly interested in
creating a society based on law (Socialist pravovoe gosudarstvd). This society would be
one with the Party and its institutions would be subordinate to legal codes. Militia
personnel would act primarily as law enforcement professionals, not servants of the Party.
With the total collapse of the Communist state, the torch for democratic reform was
passed to President Boris Yeltsin. Many difficult challenges faced the new Russian
government. The transition to a market economy brought with it a large increase in crime,
especially organized crime. Finding the new Federal Assembly unable to quickly pass laws
to combat this crime, he soon subordinated police authority directly under himself raising
the question of the future of the rule of law in Russia.
A. GORBACHEV'S REFORMS (1985-1991)
Gorbachev saw this transition of law enforcement as an eventuality, similar to
those of Western models where the continental police slowly became more accountable to
the people over time. At the same time, one of his other progressive efforts, glasnost,
severely tarnished what little image and prestige the Soviet militia still maintained in 1986.
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Public criticism of the militia and a rapid increase in economic crime countered any efforts
he made to instill rule of law. Eventually, however, history would show that the militia
and the Soviet citizens were more ready for reform than anticipated.
1. Glasnost and Public Criticism of the Police
Vivid revelations of police problems of corruption and abuses in the press between
1986 and 1988 significantly contributed to a steady decline in the police's ability to
combat the ever increasing organized crime and widening nationalist conflicts. "Once a
formidable element of the state's social control apparatus, the MVD proved unable to
combat the widening nationalist conflicts, rising crime and increasingly powerful organized
criminal groups that resulted from the policies of perestroika."
123
With glasnost the public
became aware for the first time in sixty years of the actual crime statistics. To increase
democratic police operations, Gorbachev eased the crime solve rate requirements of 95%.
Throughout Communist rule, this had been an unrealistic policy for the police compared to
any other societal standard. He also authorized independent private detective and security
services. These agencies were authorized in an attempt to privatize some elements of
police activity and ease the rapid increase in organized crime pressure on new private
businesses. However, while these services were legal, no laws or regulations to govern
their actions were enacted. The result was a democratization of policing in form but not
substance.
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Secretary Gorbachev's new policies of openness produced widespread movements
by various ethnic republics for independence. This required the establishment of a special
MVD organization dedicated to putting down demonstrations. The creation of the
OMON, Special Purpose Militia Detachments, increased the use of police forces in
aggressive conflict with citizens. Joined by Soviet Army troops to put down resistance to
central rule in the Baltics, the police troops at times protected citizens against Army
troops. This was a small sign of loyalty to public safety and willingness to protect citizens
demonstrating in nationalist movements. Added to this, was the Baltics, Moldovia and
Caucasus regions movement to establish autonomy from central government rule of their
ministries of internal affairs. "Removal of Party influence from this (MVD) key institution
of state control was seen as a prerequisite to enhanced civil rights." 124
2. Social Order verse Central Control
One of Gorbachev's leading police reformer was his Minister of Internal Affairs
from 1988 to 1990, Vadim Bakatin. Bakatin had frequently criticized the operation of the
MVD as being to closely tied to the Party and not a true law enforcement agency. To
eliminate this concern, he moved almost immediately to have the arm of the Party in the
law enforcement structure removed so as to make it closer tied to the laws of the state,
not the political arm of the government.
In practical terms, it has already been decided that political organs within
the MVD system will be abolished. Major consolidated party committees
will also be eliminated. But there is no need to go to the other extreme.




conscience and personal belief. We cannot impose such a prohibition on
people, since any ban amounts to a breach of democracy
125
His initiatives included a package of measures to further humanize the penal system,
specifically to upgrade and improve everyday conditions in jails and camps. As a result
of being vocally committed to rule of law, Bakatin quickly became enemy of the
conservative elements in the Party. By 1990, Gorbachev repealed Article 6 ofUSSR
Constitution, which guaranteed the Communist Party's monopoly on power. Increased
crime and open criticism of the police due to glasnost soon forced Gorbachev to bow to
pressure and replace Bakatin with Boris Pugo, a former KGB chief in Latvia. Pugo's
familiarity with KGB operations resulted in a evident subordination of MVD operations
to those conducted by the KGB. A 1991 Presidential decree gave the KGB and police
new broad search and seizure powers of businesses-domestic and foreign. The
Presidential decree also implemented joint street patrols between the police and Red Army
troops and increased use ofOMON to put down nationalist movements and rallies.
Frustration among conservatives rapidly built throughout the government after the 1991
banning of primary Party organizations in state institutions. This resulted in many
conservative elements, including Minister Pugo, attempting to restore the Party
hegemony.
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"In August 1991, MVD Minister Pugo, together with other military leaders, the
Vice President of the Soviet Union, the head of the KGB and leaders of the military-
industrial complex initiated a coup." Not all police leaders however, decided to violate
the laws of the Soviet state. RSFSR Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, Andrei Dunayev,
called for MVD and citizens to be loyal to Yeltsin and the USSR Constitution. On the
second day of the stand-off in Moscow, Dunayev sent a telegram to call more Russian
Republic police to Moscow. Minister Pugo, head of the coup attempt, sent a message to
head off reinforcements to the heads of police educational institutions and internal affairs
administrations. "It has been learned that the leadership of the RSFSR Ministry of Internal
Affairs has instructed the personnel of a number of educational institutions to come to
Moscow with their weapons on the morning of 21 August. In view of the fact that a state
of emergency has been declared in Moscow, I categorically forbid sending of personnel to
Moscow and Moscow Province. Minister Pugo." 128
Despite Pugo's message, police leaders and instructors at the schools outside
Moscow remained loyal. They mobilized the cadets at the academies and responded.
After a brief confrontation with Moscow Police ChiefMyrikov, they were able to move
past barricades and on to the 'White House' to assist defense of the most dangerous
sectors. Along with many police elements, the special Alpha Section of the KGB, resisted
the coup and it failed quickly. Deputy Minister Dunayev provided the following on the
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crisis against the Russian parliament and president: "From the very first hours we gave the
local level clear-cut instructions on how to act. And the Russian Republic police proved
to be loyal to the people and Constitution ofthe RSFSR." 129 One policeman standing
guard at the parliament building summed up the reason for the failure of the coup attempt.
"Gorbachev's problem all along was that he trusted the wrong people. He never had any
trust in us.'"
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Within months of the failed coup in August 1991, the Soviet state had collapsed.
With the collapse came decentralization and all law enforcement operations were
transferred from the USSR MVD to the ministries of internal affairs of each respective
successor state. It is clear from the actions of most police personnel throughout the coup,
that the personnel showed the beginnings of a loyalty to the rule of law. Despite the
attempt at restoring Communist central rule, the police acted to restore order and obeyed
the laws of the Soviet state. With the reform attempts ofglasnost came public criticism of
the police's weaknesses, this is an essential ingredient to instilling a greater loyalty of the
rule of law in society. Correcting those weaknesses and problems is the very method to
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B. YELTSIN'S REFORMS (1992-1996)
The democratic reforms initiated by Gorbachev established the framework for
newly elected Russian President Boris Yeltsin to continue the police reforms necessary to
develop public trust and professionalism. Once Yeltsin rose to one of the highest
positions in the Communist Party, he took on the role as a dissenter and then as leader of
the opposition. Once he secured his position in the first free elections in Russia, he
personally began to design and act as the architect of a new Russia. One author described
Yeltsin as possessing "a technocratic and democratic mentality, on the one hand, but also
the style of a leader and a hero." ljI When acting as a technocrat and democrat, President
Yeltsin can be receptive to different views. But at the same time as a leader with a heroic
personality, he is inclined to resort to authoritarian and forceful means to achieve his
goals. This is especially true in light of a weak and slow moving parliament.
By 1993, the growth of crime throughout the Russian state was ever increasing
and the security forces had become allies to President Yeltsin as he issued Presidential
decrees to empower them to fight crime. These decrees however, were only necessary as
the new Russian parliament was unable to effectively pass criminal legislation. With the
ever growing crime and the added issue of corruption in the police apparatus reaching an
epidemic proportion, he initiated an operation to rid the police ofunwanted elements.
This initiative, along with the goals of the MVD till the year 2005, show the true signs of
democratic reform. The process of internal review of personnel and holding officers
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accountable for their actions is an elemental step to ensure human rights guarantees and
establish the required public trust.
Immediately following the disintegration of the Soviet state, many government
agencies were disorganized and lacked central guidance. Concerned over the security of
the state, Yeltsin began by restructuring the entire security system of the Russian state.
1. Restructuring
After a review of the historical ties ofMVD and KGB, the division of labor
between each, and a close look at foreign democratic experiences, the new Russian
government found that two managerial apparatuses are necessary for state security. One
to safeguard external security, both intelligence abroad and counter-intelligence inside the
country, and one to safeguard public security, specifically for fighting crime. This review
resulted in a suggestion to form a new ministry, the Ministry of Security and Internal
Affairs. It was planned to do what the Chekist of the 1930's feared most, to break the
former KGB system of agent support, agents who are by training unsuited to fight crime in
an unbiased manner. One suggestion was to merge the MVD and the KGB in special
ways as a unified security apparatus. This was later rejected due to the efforts of Yeltsin's
first Minister of the Interior, Viktor Barannikov. "In order that we do not have to fear the
horrors of the former NKVD, let us comprehensively sort out the KGB today. Let us give
over to the police that part of its mechanism that is suitable for the fight against crime.
Give to intelligence what is capable ofworking for external security. And consign the rest
70
to the archives of our history."^ Barannikov pushed to establish formal agreements with
other republic Ministries of Internal Affairs and had a goal of uniting in a professional
solidarity. "There is nothing for us to divide up. I have no intention of nationalizing or






Barannikov's goal was to move beyond the transition difficulties experienced by
Gorbachev in his attempt to balance new social freedoms with social order through central
control. "The system of society's law-enforcement protection has been put extremely out
of balance by the numerous mistakes of perestroyka and by the process engendered by the
August putsch. And since the President has found such a way out of the law-enforcement
crisis, I am obliged, as a representative of a law-abiding profession, to take this path." 134
The road he referred to is one designed to dismantle the abusive and intrusive methods of
the Russian security apparatus and increase focus on ordinary criminal activity.
Restructuring toward decentralized execution of crime prevention measures began the
necessary changes required to provide the police and MVD authority to take a leading role
in the elimination of crime.
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After the violent showdown with Parliamentary hard-liners in 1 993 over the
division of power between the branches of government, Yeltsin however, took action to
ensure domestic order by subordinating all security organs to the President. This was not
the case from 1991-1993. Initially this appears a positive measure for action against ever
increasing crime. Over time, however, the habit of presidential decrees, if abused, can
distance police operations from consent of the public. While authoritarian methods of
police operations are effective, they do not incorporate the necessary loyalty to the rule of
law for the balance of freedoms of the individual against the maintenance of social order.
According to the Russian Constitution of 1993, "the parliament of the Russian Federation
is the representative and legislative body of the Russian Federation." 135 The Russian
President, at the same time, is granted the authority to issue decrees and directives. The
executive branch, on the other hand, is vested with the responsibility to "issue resolutions
and directives and ensure their implementation." 1 "6 As defined, executive power rests with
the government of the Russian Federation. This body consists of the Chairman, appointed
by the President and approved by the parliament; the Vice Chairman and the federal
ministers. At the same time, the constitution allows the President, designated as the Head
of State and not specifically part of any branch of the government, to issue decrees and
directives as necessary.
lj?
With a reliance on Presidential decrees and after personal
participation in drafting the 1993 Constitution, Yeltsin can be considered "...now the chief
136
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executive officer of an authoritarian system of power created largely by him and under
him."
138
President Yeltsin soon decreed reforms that required the Russian Ministry of
Internal Affairs to carry out procedural cuts quickly to gain control of the growing crime
rate. "In a month, everything should be as follows: The Ministry of Internal Affairs will
have an investigative committee and a criminal police force, which together will be
responsible for investigating major crimes of an inter-republic nature. All other crimes will
be put in the hands of the republic agencies. Another police force will also be formed- a
public safety force, which will operate in emergency situations such as floods,
earthquakes, disasters, ect."
139
These proactive measures were designed to gain control
over rising crime, both domestic an organized, due to a noted lack of legislation by the
Russian Parliament.
His decreed reforms were not without critical review, however. One such critical
review of the precedent established by Yeltsin drawing all security forces under himself,
comes from Dr. Mark Galeotti of the University of Keele.
In January, the government was restructured both to reflect new conditions
and to centralize power more tightly into the hands of the president...The
beginning of 1994 thus sees the Russian government deploying an
expanding array of security organizations, largely built on the basis of
Soviet services and armed with a wide range of powers and responsibilities.
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Beset with crime, economic crisis and the rising threat from neo-fascism, it
is easy to see why Yeltsin wants these powers, but the Soviet era shows the
limitations of the organizations. Andropov controlled them, but did not
really know what he could do with them. Gorbachev tried to use them to
reform, and found them unprepared to obey him. Yeltsin drew the sword
to use against parliament last October. Can he now use or sheath it? 140
At the same time, the restructuring plan and the 1994 Presidential decree were
defended by Vice Minister of Internal Affairs Mikhail Yegorov. He argued that the 1994
presidential decree was an urgent measure to protect the population against organized
crime.
The decree has made it possible for us to slow down the proliferation of
organized crime and all crime. Under the decree, as many as 22,400
persons have been detained for 30 days— the most disputable point we had
with regard to that decree. Out of those, 16,000 were charged and 12,000
arrested.
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Yegorov points out that undoubtedly, everyone is concerned about possible human rights
violations, but he adds that the decree also contained a number of other powers granted to
law enforcement agencies. These powers included the right to conduct financial
investigations and expert studies before criminal proceedings were initiated, a practice
never before authorized under Soviet law. This enables the police to confiscate property
and funds essential in the investigative process without the use of warrants and probable
cause. This is the very concern expressed by Dr. Galeotti. The protection of individual
rights in the criminal investigation process is an essential element of democratic police
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operations. These overreaching search and seizure powers, not granted by laws passed by
a legislative body, but instead are the policies decreed by the president alone.
The Vice Ministry of Internal Affairs justifies this use of presidential decrees due to
the lack of effective and necessary laws.
The next point I would like to make, frankly, is that the laws and the
legislation in general are the tools that we law-enforcement agencies use in
our work. And I will tell you that a production engineer or manager who
does not improve his tools is bad. The law is our tool. Undoubtedly, we
have taken a long time to draft new laws on organized crime. 142
Yegorov highlights as an example, the definition found in one of the laws passed on
organized crime. He argues that under the law only associations can be targets of law-
enforcement bodies, not individuals. He complains that the definition of associations
requires illegal activity only when two groups have united. 14j
This is a good example of the issues facing reform of the Russian police. Without
good laws, police personnel must rely on Presidential decrees for guidance and not federal
laws passed by the legislative branch. As cautioned by Dr. Galeotti, this may result in an
inability to restore the authority of police activity to the parliament when that body begins
to function in an efficient manner in the area of public security. "Yeltsin said that
lawmaking by presidential decrees will continue on matters that have not yet been
regulated by existing legislation."144 As such, President Yeltsin continues to focus on the
142
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urgent issue of rampant crime throughout the Russian state. This resulted in an additional
decree to provide law enforcement bodies the authority to rid the state of this new crime.
3. Increased Police Authority Against Crime
One of the first hurdles for reform of police operations was the open recognition of
crime within the state. Under the Soviet regime, crime statistics were manipulated to
maintain a Communist myth that a low rate of crime was one of the greatest advantages of
the their system over capitalism. As Dmitry Mikheyev argues, this was to justify the
police state as safer for citizens then the "dangerous world of capitalism, where citizens
were deprived of security and protection."
145
Acting Procurator General Aleksei
Iliushenko claims that before the idea oiglasnost took hold, the MVD has knowingly
failed to document crimes and falsified citizens' complaints in an effort to maintain the
appearance of a decline in the crime rate.
146 With glasnost however, there was an
apparent truth in reporting as statistics showed a rapid growth in crime. 'Trom 1987 to
1989 the number of premeditated murders was said to have increased by 130 percent;
rapes were said to have increased by 120 percent; and cases of serious bodily injury were
alleged to have risen by 150 percent."
147
If the numbers are correct, today crime statistics
are approximately six times higher than reported under the Soviet system. Much of the
rise in crime can be attributed to the reduction of Soviet police authority in the lives of the
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society was not already profoundly corrupt and criminal. "[I]ts criminality was different
from that in democratic and free-market societies."
148 With the collapse of the Soviet
police state, the Soviet criminal element was able to merge with the former nomenklatura
system and produce a very lucrative organized crime element. Stephen Handleman,
author of Comrade Criminal, a in depth look at the criminal underworld that survived and
even thrived off the gulag system under Soviet rule, calls this the "Thieves World."
In July 1996, President Yeltsin issued an edict to reinforce law and order and
intensify the fight against crime in the Moscow Oblast. This edict strengthened the right
of authorities to hold prisoners, increased salaries and personnel levels, and issued new
rules on the authority to confiscate property. The new rules established specific authority
for holding persons in social rehabilitation centers for up to 30 days with authorization of
the procurator ofMoscow; authorized confiscation of property, similar to the Drug
Enforcement Agency and other US agency authority where homes and vehicles can be
confiscated if used in the act of a felony; increased salaries ofjudges and technical
personnel to ensure quality of their work and longevity; and increased troop levels. 149
Anatoliy Kulikov, the Minister of Interior, "declared that compliance with international
legal norms and the Constitution of Russia was a fundamental point ofthe edict." He also
urged members of Parliament to "get laws on the fight against crime through the State








The new edict calls for a significant increase of law-enforcement manpower in the
Moscow area. Specifically, it calls for 18,671 new posts to be filled in police stations in
Moscow alone. Also, another 10,000 agents are being recruited to form a 'motorized'
reinforcement of interior troops. These troops would be based in the city capital, while
local courts and prosecutor officers as well as Moscow tax police will get a total of 1,850
additional servicemen.
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These new numbers would greatly improve the police's ability to
slow down the proliferation of organized crime throughout the Moscow region. But with
the addition of personnel and the efforts to improve the quality of recruits by using higher
salaries, comes an increased authority for detaining citizens and more time for police to
evaluate the situation. This has the potential to increase human rights violations and will
require additional efforts to address and investigate them. Not to mention the need to
ensure methods to punish personnel who abuse authority. One of the positive elements of
the edict includes the development of a witness protection system. "The decree also
introduces a sort of witness protection system, modeled on the program used by American
law enforcement agencies, to protect witnesses testifying about power abuses, official
corruption and crime organizations."
Regardless of the positive measures implicated in the edict, the use of centralized
presidential decrees to direct the security ministries and combat crime only instills a loyalty
to a specific leader, not necessarily the rule of law. With the Soviet tradition of
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totalitarian methods to control social conduct, the new Russian society striving for
democracy does not understand the balance of freedom and justice. Without effective
laws, public safety will have to remain in the office of the president, but this may be a
tragic practice. A promising sign that the presidential control over the police apparatus is
only temporary and is truly dedicated to democratic police operations, is evidenced by the
initiative to eliminate corruption and increase professional conduct of all officers. As
noted by President Yeltsin himself in his state of the nation address to the Federal
Assembly in February 1996 - "The effort to purge law enforcement bodies of corrupt
officials and traitors, which began last year, will be continued this year." 153
4. Reducing Corruption
While there remains rampant corruption in the Russian police, work is being done
to clean up the force. Results of an anti-corruption operation, Operation "Clean Hands"
initiated in 1995 reached the highest levels of the MVD. Internal investigations resulted in
Internal Affairs Minister Anatoliy Kulikov firing Moscow Oblast Main Internal Affairs
Directorate Deputy Chief General Valeriy Aksakov and Chief ofthe Regional Directorate
for Fighting Organized Crime, Alesksandr Kartashov, for corruption. Specifically, both
were charged with misappropriation of combat weapons and failure to take measures
against criminal firms in Moscow and the Moscow Oblast that were selling contraband
foreign-made vehicles with phony customs declarations. 154 All told, 960 officers were
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fired in 1995 with disciplinary action against another 6,000 of the more than 100,000
serving in the MVD. 15
Major General Svyatoslav Golitsin, head of the MVD's Administration for Internal
Security, an office that was set up in January 1995 to fight crime within the MVD,
reported 1,277 police officers were convicted in the 1995 "Clean Hands" campaign; 533
for abuse of office.
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This trend ofmaking corruption, and the elimination of it, public is
critical to democratic police operations. The issues that confront the MVD are evident in
the description ofDeputy Chief of the Main Directorate for Organized Crime within the
Russian Interior Ministry, Police Colonel Vyacheslav Burkovich. "All violations oflaw
committed by the employees of the law enforcement bodies can be divided into three
parts. The first category is formed by domestic crimes, crimes that have nothing to do
with their official duties. The second category is formed by offenses when officials exceed
their powers when discharging their duties. And the third is the smallest in terms of
numbers but, in our opinion, the most dangerous one. These are crimes when official
powers are used for criminal purposes."
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Vladimir Kirakozov, ofthe State Prosecutor's Office ofRussia, finds the problem
of abuse of authority stems from a basic misunderstanding ofthe idea of public service.
This can be traced to the legacy of the Soviet society's mistrust of agents of the state.
The professionals that are being trained for us by the Higher School of
Militia, the law institutions, the junior militia training schools are not
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enough. As a result, we have to employ people from, so to say, the civilian
walks of life. Such a person, the moment he puts a militia service cap on
his head, starts regarding himself as a representative of a state body at
whose beck and call everyone around him should be, and not the other way
around. This psychological feature, a lack of proper value orientation
among some members of the personnel, leads to permissiveness, to
rudeness and violence with regard to citizens, arrogance.
It appears that leaders of the Russian law enforcement community understand the
basic elements necessary for democratic police operations, but must overcome years of
communist police traditions and mind-set. According to Police Colonel Burkovich: "Any
breach of law committed by a police employee provokes popular resentment. Any crime
evokes mistrust among people, mistrust ofthe authorities. And we believe that law
violations perpetrated by the personnel of the law enforcement system should be
minimized." 159 He stresses the goal of treating every single case of corruption the way
they are handled in democratic Western countries, as a high priority to prosecute all
violations. He is focused on the idea that Russian law enforcement bodies should retain
the trust ofmembers of society. He believes in the principle that public trust is essential to
democracy, that the citizens of the society should not hesitate to seek help for fear of not
getting justice, which is the current case in Russia. The road to reform officer conduct can
primarily be found in reform of personnel training. In a Kremlin news interview, Interior






officers who will carry on the job in the 21st century, those who will shape the image of
the policemen in the 2 1 st century
160
5. Training Efforts
Russia's problem in police training is both quantitative and qualitative. This stems
from decades of using a policy to conscript Ministry of Internal Affairs forces. The
Interior Ministry has tried to solve both quantitative and qualitative problems
simultaneously. Their goal is to increase the number of qualified recruits accepted, while
instilling a standardized training program along internationally accepted techniques.
Currently there are 29 establishments of higher education, 16 of secondary education, or
academies, and approximately 140 training centers and various branches and departments
to train specialists in various fields.
The first method of reforming training includes attempts to attract young people
who are contemplating service in the Ministry of Interior. "What attracts them is the
specialized training and specialization in various branches ofjurisprudence, those that will
be encountered by them in an establishment of higher learning."
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Furthermore, they are
focusing on the initial training of personnel, the policemen specifically. As it is planned,
everyone joining the MVD will undergo a standard six-month initial training course. Four
months of the training would focus on theory and two months would place emphasis on
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practical training in the various bodies of the MVD. Currently, they have established 140
training centers across Russia. "We are building them up because at the end of the year
some 15 to 20 percent of the new personnel are untrained because of shortages of places
at training centers."
16
^ This initial training is designed to provide new personnel with basic
knowledge of the MVD and authorize the individual the right to be issued a firearm.
Then, as required, comes a secondary education in one of the 16 educational
establishments, and finally the 29 higher education facilities to train various specialties. All
of these initiatives are designed to focus training on a more standard international basis.
These efforts are in conjunction with extensive international cooperation and exchanges
not only with the United States, but Germany, Austria, and Canada.
Reform has also been instituted at the academy for command personnel. They
have adopted what Russians term "a soft reform." Major General Yuri Puzanov,
responsible for police training facilities and personnel, explains the efforts to restructure
the entire education program to meet new needs ofthe state. ceWe cut the time allotted for
retraining top-level personnel, brought training closer to practical needs. We introduced
the active form of instruction, it accounts for some 60 percent ofthe program." 164 The
next part of training reform includes the introduction of correspondence students, to
enhance the training for those unable to attend the institutions of higher education. The
students work in the field that will be the subject of their study in the academy. This






improve the overall education of officers and enhance standardization throughout the
MVD.
The quantitative issues are what give the leaders of the MVD the most concern.
This is the area in which the educational system reforms should address, specifically the
number of personnel being trained in law enforcement specialties. In the past, the number
of students entering police educational establishments were 12,000. By 1996, the number
has grown to 37,000. This has been complicated by a measure to increase a means
competition between applicants according to Personnel Chief Astapkin. "We have
competitions on a regional basis to ensure that all regions have enough personnel
regardless of the level of preparation. Ifwe decided in favor of a universal competition,
applications from remote areas would probably fail to gain admission." 165
On the qualitative side, Russian MVD leaders are not satisfied with the quality of
the training being received. In particular they are unhappy about the attitude ofthe
graduates toward their work with the population. Opinion polls in Western democracies
have shown a 60% trust in police by the public, in Russia it is 20-30% of the public trust
the police.
166
This is due to the attitude of the policeman to his job and the public he is
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there to serve. "Our personnel have to still get used to the idea that they are servants of
the public."
167
Western democratic countries focus training of law enforcement personnel on
practical training in applying the law. In Russia the focus is more directed toward theory
than training. One area of needed improvement is Russian's lack of on the job training
familiar to Western democratic police training where officers must be qualified by a field
training officer before acting individually. This has been improved, as the international
community has become more deeply involved in the democratic police training in former
communist countries. Personnel Chief Astapkin explains the Russian approach to
international training efforts:
In promoting international cooperation in personnel training we assume
that no system of personnel training in any country is perfect. Every
system should meet the national conditions, and suit the level of economic
development. But the basis of all national systems of personnel training is
commitment to combating crime. And this is the common denominator
that enables us to borrow each other's experience and to develop
relations.
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Last year, together with the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), the Russian
government developed a program of seminars on various aspects of crime control. With
the assistance of the United States State Department, approximately 150 trainees
participated in training in the United States and more than 200 were trained in Russia with








international training cooperation, the Russian government has been supportive in the
creation of a European police academy in Budapest, Hungary. In 1997, the first Russians
will study at the International Law Enforcement Academy. 170
Dedicated to instilling a standard of police conduct throughout Europe, the
Academy is considered by Astapkin as essential to the development of a quality Russian
police training system. "It is not by chance that every group of trainees that go abroad
includes a significant number ofteachers of our higher educational institutions who then
suggest changes in our curricula, and use foreign experience in their seminars." The
MVD and Russian government have aggressively used the international police community
to focus and refine their training program at all levels. This cooperation, as expressed by
FBI agent Charles Byrd, shows a dedication to professional police conduct and
operations.
172 One conflicting issue remains however. That issue is the role of the entire
judicial system in Russian society. Police efforts and conduct are only halfthe battle in
fighting crime, the Russian judicial system itself must be reformed for the process of law






See Chapter II, page 32.
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C. JUDICIAL ROLE
For the first three years of the new democratic Russian state an effective struggle
against crime was handicapped by the absence of any legislative framework. This, coupled
with the legacy of Soviet secret laws, made the role of the judicial reform critical. The
introduction of the new civil and criminal code was initially impossible without a new
democratic constitution and productive legislative organs. After the struggle for power
ended by force the Yeltsin sponsored Consitution was ratified in 1 993 . Once a new
political structure established what one newspaper's describes as the rules of the game.
"The state began increasingly to engage in what should be its principle business: setting
the rule of the game in the market." 17"' Since their creation however, the legislative body
and courts have shown little initiative to effectively assert their Constitutional authority
and this has lead to weak legislative oversight for Russia's police organizations.
1. Balance of Powers
One of the fundamental prerequisites for rule of law is an independent judiciary.
"At the most fundamental level, the principal purpose of the courts in virtually any system
is to serve as forum for the peaceful resolution of disputes."174 Under Soviet law the
rights and duties of citizens were often regulated not by laws but decrees of the Council of
Ministers. The rule of law, Rechtsstaat, principally calls for issues that concern the rights
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and duties of citizens to be regulated by laws enacted by a democratic representative body.
175
This was not the case with Soviet legality. The tradition of executive edicts and secret
administrative laws has created a challenge for the new Russian legislature and courts.
The politicization of the Russian Constitutional Court in the early 1990's rendered
it more a high-profile political tool than a credible judicial institution. This has resulted in
the Court compromising their strength as an independent judicial body ofgovernment that
is loyal to the Constitution and not the leader of the nation. "As typified by the weakness
of the Constitutional Court, Russia cannot make significant progress toward a democratic
government and free-market economy until several problems with the judiciary are
resolved and the rule of law is established."
176
Neil Kritz, writing on the rule of law in new democracies, argues that this is due to
the difficulty in establishing a legitimate justice system after a legacy of dictatorship or
central control. The authority for a separation of powers is in the Constitution and
comprehending the strength of the rule of law requires time and practice. "It takes a
couple of years or more to establish new lines of command, and build a new credible
criminal justice system. In Russia, Georgia, ... to cite a few examples, this time lag has
resulted in a security vacuum readily capitalized upon by criminal elements." The
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security vacuum mentioned by Kritz is what plagues Russia today and has resulted in the
extensive use of Presidential power by Yeltsin.
The rule of law imposes a network of institutions and legal procedures. These
check the sources of tension, constrain the ability of any one branch of the government to
engage in violent or abusive action, and force an open governmental process. Essentially,
it levels the playing field to ensure a true balance of powers that keeps the government and
its institutions in line with the rights proclaimed in the state's constitution.
To address this problem, the new Russian state has to move quickly. They must
establish courts that are above corruption and intimidation by criminal elements, police
forces that are legislatively supported, and individual officers who held accountable for
violations in discretion. The key to this is prompt training to cleanse law enforcement and
criminal justice systems.
The rule of law requires that governments adhere to principles of
transparency and predictability, and it establishes several mechanisms to
ensure that this is so. These include requirements that laws be adopted
through an open and public process by a representative body, all
regulations be published, no rules be applied retroactively, government
agencies conduct their affairs according to prescribed rules, and the whole
system be subject to judicial scrutiny to ensure compliance with these
rules.
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As discussed in Chapter II, law enforcers in all societies enjoy a certain degree of




laws they function under are known only to the enforcers and not to the very citizens
subject to its authority.
2. Legislative Oversight
Legislative inactivity and indecisiveness have prevailed in the early years of
Russia's democratic transition. "The norm in the Duma during the last several years is
writhing and fractious debates between ideologically-polarized political parties that do not
produce solutions to pressing social and economic problems in Russia." The
consequence of this friction is a legislature that is seen by the Russian people to be
weakened by indecision and paralysis. One of the most difficult challenges has been the
revision of the civil and criminal codes. The most obvious sign of legislative
ineffectiveness in this area is the fact that the revised criminal code did not go into effect
until 1 January 1997 and it is not even complete.
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Placing all the Russian power ministries under the direct control of the president
has resulted in the Russian legislature having no control over them. Hence parliamentary
oversight is ineffective. "These facts point to serious problems for Russian democracy;
too much power is concentrated in the hands of the president, and the other branches of
government are too weak." 181 This creates a dichotomy for Russian government and law
enforcement bodies. With Russia's crisis of crime, the strong hand of force must be
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asserted from the government. If it is not to come from the legislature, it must come for
the executive branch. The problem arises however, when this force is not checked by the
judicial branch of the government and functions without oversight. In his article which
estimates the prospects for the rule of law in the Soviet Union, Leonard Schapiro wrote
"It seems perhaps difficult for dictators to become accustomed to the idea that the main
purpose of law is, in fact to make their tasks more difficult." 182 The society must decide
just as other democracies have struggled with the balance of order and freedom. Which
are more essential, efficient and forceful law enforcement or the individual guarantees set
forth in the nation's constitution? The argument is always essentially the same: "that the
efficient administration of criminal law will be hampered by the adoption of procedures
designed to protect individual liberties." 18"
While Russia struggles with this issue ofthe balance of powers and legislative
oversight within the government, apparently the legacy of secret administrative laws is
slowly fading with democracy. One such example is, that while in the past all laws passed
on the Ministry of Internal Affairs were secret, they are now as readily available as are
other Russian laws passed. Oda Hiroshi argues that there are three reasons the Statute on
the Ministry of Internal Affairs was classified in the past. First it called for censorship and
control of the reproduction of information. "This function of controlling the flow of
information has seldom been mentioned in Soviet sources, but it is well known in the West
182
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that matters relating to censorship are regarded as state secrets."
184
Second, the
traditional use of the Internal Forces, the military trained forces for domestic
demonstrations, and their traditional role and cooperation with the defense forces. Lastly
was that the MVD forces were required to support and assist the KGB. "It provides that
the ministry should assist the 'agency of state security' in the struggle against 'especially
dangerous crimes' against the state and in other matters related to state security."
Today, the Law on MVD no longer is involved in controlling reproduction of information.
However, the traditional role of the Internal Troops and the link to the Federal Security
Service is still relevant and yet the law is no longer classified. The most likely explanation
is that the latter two roles focus on combating organized crime. This is something which
is much needed in Russia today and requires some level of cooperation.
The collapse of the Soviet police state not only created economic challenges for
Russia, but also left a significant vacancy in the conduct of law enforcement operations.
This vacancy was not filled initially by a proactive and effective legislature. Thus Russia
has seen a significant growth in the power and authority of the President as he moves to
strengthen the state's fight against crime. At the same time, the branch of government set
forth in the Russian Constitution to prevent abuses of power by either the legislature or
the executive, must over come a legacy of central control and political influence. Both of
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final chapter will consider these attempts at democratic reform as compared to the
democratic police principles presented in Chapter II. I will assess Russia's potential for
success. To do so I will analyze their efforts to ensure the police forces act primarily as
law enforcement professionals with a civic sense of duty, not servants of the particular
leadership of the government.
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V. EVALUATION OF REFORMS
Yeltsin cannot be judged as if he were the president of a stable
democracy with an established constitutional order.
Richard Nixon 186
Former President Nixon's observation highlights the critical challenge that faced
both Soviet leader Gorbachev and Russian President Yeltsin. Gorbachev faced the major
dilemma of trying to open Soviet society while also maintaining Communist central rule.
He found out quickly that to maintain the unity of the USSR he had to abandon some of
his commitments to build democratic police principles. By implementing the reforms
suggested by President Yeltsin the Russian state finally made the necessary move toward
democratic police operations. This move began with the idea that the Russian police
needed to become a professional law enforcement body, not a force to be used by the
KGB or the state for unsavory tasks, such as instilling fear in citizens, that are connected
with maintaining central control. The continued efforts by President Yeltsin to eliminate
corruption, improve training, and empower the police against crime, show the signs of a
democratic transition. Hazards lie ahead, however, in the lack ofgood laws to ensure a
balance requisite in any democracy, the right mix of individual freedom and restraint,
including responsible law enforcement. With a continued use of presidential decrees, a
manipulation of the Constitution as it relates to the control of governmental organs may
stifle any true rule oflaw reform efforts.
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A. APPROACH TO RULE OF LAW
Russian leaders appear to realize that the basis of a democratic rule of law resides
in legislation and constitutional rights. Both are considered vital for the state's democratic
transition. The challenge of restraint on rules and procedures to achieve social order is
not yet fully understood by Russian society, a society that has only known centuries of
authoritarian rule. Unlike its Western European counterparts, the Soviet police tradition
was never oriented toward protecting the society. With respect for human rights
guaranteed in the 1993 Russian Constitution, this has the potential for slowly changing.
Without the proper laws to ensure those rights, the Russian citizen must rely on the
president. Current Interior Minister Anatoly Kulikov presents concerns not only for the
creation of good legislation, but also for how legislation will be applied by policemen.
"These are the laws and rights that they are duty-bound to observe and protect. But what
will be the laws and rights in the society ofthe 21st century? How will the environment
affect the young graduates after they begin to work?"187
This issue is being addressed in the area of training and an attempt to instill the
democratic principle of public service. From the qualitative and quantitative initiatives
being undertaken to enhance the quality of police personnel through recruitment and
training, it appears that positive effects are underway. It will be, however, the application
of the new training efforts that will determine in the success. Lieutenant General Igor




attitude of the system and society will change that upon implementation in the field. "If
you talk to the students and faculty of our educational establishments, you will see one
aim -- to ensure a calm life for people, to ensure protection of their rights, interests, to
ensure observance of interests of the state. Such is their task. But when they begin their
professional work, unfortunately, the environment at times has its effects." 1
In an effort to focus on the police application of the rule of law and address
standards of human dignity, Russia has developed research centers. The centers are in
Moscow, St. Petersburg, Ekaterinburg and Irkutsk, founded with money from the
MacArthur Foundation to develop ways to enhance law enforcement operations. 189 The
Chief ofPersonnel, Lieutenant General Astapkin, also recognizes the necessary work
required in this area. "The subject of law-enforcement and human rights is very new and
important to us. You know the situation in this country. There are many areas where a
lot of improvement is needed as far as human rights are concerned. For instance, our
system of penitentiary facilities needs to be reformed."
190 The area of penal reform is a
very complicated and difficult task that, unfortunately, is beyond the scope of this
assessment but is an area also being addressed by the Russian government. This is due to
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Russia is using the experience of legislation in other countries to adopt a
democratic orientation to the rule of law and its application in law enforcement. The
Russian government translation office translates approximately 100 pieces of legislation
annually from various other democratic countries in an effort to contribute to the
development of Russia's own legal framework. In the words of the Chief of the Ministry
of Interior International Relations Directorate, Valery Gorchakov: "... knowing and being
directly involved in law-enforcement activities, even doing joint patrol duty together with
American policemen or British policemen, our police workers know how the policemen in
other countries behave in this or that situation." 191 Combining the legal framework and
application of the laws has helped Russian MVD officials guide their own judicial reform.
B. COMPARISON WITH DEMOCRATIC POLICE PRINCIPLES
An orientation to general democratic principles, as addressed above, is seen in a
slow movement toward legislation that is essential for the development of the rule of law.
With a weak legislature, the strength of the law enforcement agencies has come directly
from the President. Despite an arguably autocratic use of presidential decrees, President
Yeltsin has made several efforts to re-focus the Russian police toward democratic police
operations. While these reforms have not seen an extended test period, it can be said that
major efforts have significantly moved the MVD, and more specifically the police, to a
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more professional police force. This move, while not complete, shows a significant effort
at an adherence to the development of a code of conduct for police. Work is still
necessary, however, in creating a force determined to serve society and protect lives.
Table 1 graphically depicts an overall assessment ofRussia's democratic police reforms.
Table 1. Comparison of Reforms against Democratic Police Principles
Democratic Principles Assessment
1) An orientation to democratic principles - Flux (Weak legislature and lack of
complete penal code)
2) Adherence to a code of conduct - Yes (Efforts to professionalize and
eliminate corruption)
3) Protection and safety of lives - Flux (Hampered by remaining corruption)
4) Public Service - Flux (Lack of civic sense of duty)
5) Focus on crime against persons and property - Yes (Despite reliance on Presidential
Decrees for authority)
6) Respect for human dignity - Flux (Improving with international
training)
7) Non-discrimination - Flux (Improving with international
training)
The efforts to adhere to a code of conduct can be seen specifically in the continued
use of Operation "Clean Hands." 192 Only with a diligent effort to establish a legitimate
force in the eyes of society can the Russian police forces move forward in their defeat of
192
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crime. The creation of a criminal investigative element has made crime control a more
central focus for the MVD, and this has enhanced the quality of the criminal investigations
conducted. This initiative, however, comes with the potential for further human rights
abuses due to an increased police authority to hold persons suspected of a crime. This
drawback can, however, be counterbalanced by a second Yeltsin initiative, the 1995
efforts to rid the MVD of corruption and to hold officers more accountable for abuses, as
in Western democracies. Operation "Clean Hands" has instituted an essential check on the
Russian police force as a whole. This program will enhance police professionalism and
build up the Russian public's trust in the police force's integrity at the same time.
Public trust is ofimmediate importance as organized crime has penetrated local
police agencies, a situation that has reduced the society's trust in the police. As
highlighted in a 1995 Russian MVD roundtable video, Russian journalists claim that it
appears that the police forces are accepting criminal rules ofthe game. This must be
countered by focusing on the public call for elimination of internal corruption. One such
avenue is the demonstrated passion of several of the younger new police officers. They
appear to acknowledge that someone must stand up for the people against crime.
President Yeltsin has provided one ofthe other necessary means for improving the crime
situation. Increased police authority and resources will greatly improve the law
enforcement agencies' ability to counter the proliferation of crime, and empower police to
combat even better resourced and organized criminal elements. The added personnel,
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salaries, and equipment in the area ofthe motorized troops leads, however, to a question
of the controls on the police's use of force. As the police grow in size and ability, while
the military suffers from neglect and poor funding, it should be cautioned that their
adherence to democratic principles is more essential than ever. The quantitative and
qualitative efforts in place are a means of achieving this goal. The ground work has been
established to instill the proper ethics and police methods necessary. This will, it may be
hoped, guarantee the ability of the professional MVD officers to question any use of the
police forces beyond democratic professional law enforcement operations. As the
legitimacy ofthe International Law Enforcement Academy grows, the standard of a level
of restraint for police operations will increase the maintenance of social order in Russia.
1. International Cooperation
Respect for human dignity is a fundamental democratic principle espoused by the
United Nations. Since the collapse of Communism, the United States has contributed
more than 1 5 million dollars in assistance to promote cooperation in law-enforcement
training to jointly solve crimes while instilling due process ideals. According to FBI
Deputy Assistant Director Jim Moody: "Just a year ago, we took a major cooperative step
with other Federal agencies and other foreign nations with the creation of the International
Law Enforcement Academy in Budapest, Hungary. This is the rare opportunity to extend




This increased cooperation is an added positive step to achieving the
Democratic Police Standards, specifically: standardized training; an officer code of
conduct to eliminate corruption and gain public trust; and instilling public service
standards. However, concern must still be focused on individual state efforts to ensure
human rights. This is an area of transition not yet fully completed. A balance is still
necessary between the sweeping authority provided police to combat crime, and the rights
of the individual citizen.
All democratic states struggle with this very issue ofthe proper balance to ensure
order and the individual freedoms of citizens. Western democracies have been wrestling
with this difficult issue seriously for centuries. As the situations of rampant organized
crime, political violence, and especially terrorism can show, the use of legitimate force by
the state can quickly whittle away the basic rights of the very citizens it is supposed to
protect. A good example of this is the precarious situation in Northern Ireland. The
British government has been forced to make a challenging decision: to use force and
restrict liberties to ensure order, or to allow chaos to rein. To preserve the order ofthe
state, the British Parliament ascertained that certain liberties must be subdued and
restricted to ensure the stability of the democratic order. As they eventually discovered,
however, special legislation, such as Internment and the Prevention of Terrorism Act, may
only serve to alienate the citizens and fuel the propaganda and goals ofthe criminal
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terrorists. These are areas where international assistance can be beneficial to all
democratic states. While sovereignty is always a road block in the minds of leaders, the
decision making process and the resulting police tactics to be used can be enhanced by
sharing knowledge and experience. This can already be seen in the international fight
against crime.
International assistance is essential to solve a world crime dilemma, the rapid
spread of organized crime. The FBI's approach to combating Russian and other
international organized crime groups includes the provision of specific law enforcement
training to foreign law enforcement agencies. With funds from the US State Department,
the FBI has trained approximately 1 800 law enforcement officers from Russia, Ukraine,
Latvia, Poland, and Lithuania. "This training demonstrates to police agencies of the new
democracies how effective law enforcement can be conducted within the legal framework
of a democratic society, and provides the necessary core, general and specified law
enforcement instruction.
195 One ofthe beneficial aspects of this increased international
training is the interaction opportunity it provides the trainers and the trainees. Specific
crime problems in individual countries can be examined and discussions can focus on how
to address the problems. Also, the training provides a unique opportunity to share
experiences learned in the process and develop relationships for future cooperation.
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The academy in Budapest comes as a direct result ofthe FBI director's trip to
Eastern Europe in 1994 and President Clinton's direction to US Government Agencies to
join together to increase the world's capabilities in fighting international crime. "The
academy brings together seasoned investigators as instructors and law enforcement
officers from across Eastern Europe, Russia, and the Newly Independent States to learn
policing under the Rule ofLaw."
196
It provides an eight week professional development
program similar to our FBI National Academy program at Quantico, VA. During fiscal
year 1995, each ofthree classes graduated 33 mid-level police officers from a variety of
East European states (Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia,
Estonia, and Lithuania). Fiscal year 1996 had a much more aggressive schedule, in that
approximately 200 persons were scheduled to be trained from Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Estonia, Hungry, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland,
Russia, Slovenia and Ukraine.
197 Deputy Assistant Director Moody described this effort
as an essential element in assisting Eastern Europe and Russia on their road to full
democratic police operations. "Along with the instruction geared to the investigation of
crimes, we have provided training in ethics and internal police controls, the first time that
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FBI Director Louis Freeh acknowledges that it is not the fundamentals of police
operations that Russia needs assistance with; it is dedication to the rule oflaw and
professional conduct that must be enhanced.
They don't simply want us to teach them how to do surveillance, how to
do electronic wiretapping. They know that very well. They've been doing
that successfully for decades. But what they haven't been doing well, and
what they don't have anybody else to teach them except the Americans, is
the Rule ofLaw which we steadfastly and persistently apply to all our
efforts. We need to teach them not so much the science of policing — that
they know; we need to teach them the police ethics, the protocols that we
use, the notions of due process. 199
Since the beginning of 1996, the United States has trained 150 Russian Federation MVD
officers on internal police controls, detailing how the United States police regulate
themselves. The goal was to teach them how to democratically monitor each other to
ensure that the police have the leadership and rank and file that are corruption-free and
that understand the principles of due process. 200
2. Due Process
Despite these moves to function under international standards, two due process
issues still present a potential problem to democratic police operations. These are human
rights, and the overall attitude of policemen toward the community they are required to
serve. In the area ofhuman rights, at the end of 1996, the US State Department's annual
review ofhuman rights gave Russia a mixed review. The report still cites the use of
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torture in prisons and high rates of corruption that persist throughout the Russian
MVD. 201 Additionally, it can be argued that the 1995 Presidential Decree authorizing
broad search and seizure authority, and extending the time required before officials are
required to file charges with the Procurator General, show signs of sweeping police
authority. Without the proper oversight by responsible agencies, the procedures could
lead to grave civil rights abuses.
There are several arenas, however, where due process progress can be noted. The
first concerns a suspect's right to counsel, a right often extensively abused under Soviet
law enforcement efforts. "Counsel is now admitted upon a suspect's detention, arrest, or
the presentation of a criminal charge. Prior to 1 December 1989, counsel was admitted
only later, at the start of or after the pretrial investigation."
202
A second area is the opening of the entire judicial process after decades of secrecy. After
75 years, the new Russian judicial system re-introduced trial by jury in 1995. "Citizens are
now subject to laws rather than the arbitrary dictates of the state ~ a critically important
distinction."
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This is a clear sign of a determination to shed the procedural secrecy that
perpetuated the abuses of individual rights and inhibited due process. Vladimir Rubanov,
former department head in the KGB's Research Institute, noted that secrecy is a product
of, and condition for, the function of the "administrative" ~ hierarchical structures for
governing society. Secrecy actually harms the perestroika process. "Secrecy in the
201







operation of the apparatus of power creates the danger that it will become an independent
and unaccountable force."204 Openness and democratization have begin to unveil the
secrecy of the entire judicial process. This shift from secret to open justice may take many
years to complete, but the farther that shift progresses, the more likely it will be to ensure
human rights and inviolable due process to citizens.
The second issue stalling democratic police operations is the attitude of the police
force toward the public they are supposed to protect. This problem is seen in a lack of
police responses to complaints filed by victims of crimes. Recently Minister Kulikov has
directed investigations into this matter. He is focusing on the registration of crimes and
how citizens' statements are handled. He is aware of the fact that mismanagement in this
arena will further degrade public trust. "There are indeed a lot of violations and abuses in
Moscow over the filing of statements of crimes."205 Minister Kulikov confirms the
continued need for reform in Russia's police efforts.
Until strict observance and compliance with the constitution and the laws
have become a natural norm of behavior, an obligation, and a moral duty, it
is premature to speak about establishment of legislation and democracy in
Russia. Only by creating a civil society based on principles of respect and
observance ofthe law can we avoid the dogma of contending ideologies. 206
This concern for civil duty and respect for laws is a process not easily completed. Only
through assertive legislative efforts, a strong constitutional court, and an extensive
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education in schools, can the decades of social distrust be removed. While the loss of
state and law enforcement power initially was not compensated for by any form of civility
or self-restraint, as the governmental bodies develop and living conditions improve, there
will be a renaissance of the human spirit. This will hopefully contribute to an overall
decline in crime throughout Russia.
The positive steps in the training and professional ethics of the Russian police are
elementary in the move from the former Soviet continental police methods to a democratic
police force. As all Western democracies found necessary in the age of the Enlightenment,
once the seeds of democratic police operations are planted and as generations ofMVD
personnel are exposed to international standards, the society develops the call for
adherence to such standards.
C. CONCLUSION
As Russia continues to make the complicated transition to democratic police
operations, it is imperative that the international community continue to provide training
and assistance as necessary. However, the re-focusing of police efforts from those
involving protection ofthe interests ofthe state over those of the individual, to a role
centered on protecting and serving the citizens of the state will take time.
The leadership ofthe Russian Interior Ministry has made several efforts in this
positive direction. Both the qualitative and quantitative efforts to recruit, train and
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maintain officers called upon to conduct law enforcement operations and the progress
made toward a standard of public service are fundamental. In the words of Personnel
Chief Astapkin:
The key to personnel policy has always been to pick honest and decent
people of the right age envisaged by the Law on the Militia, and the same
requirements are put to the top executives. They should be people with
experience in the field, highly regarded and decent people. We are
introducing tests, psychological and physical. 207
With this effort, along with the positive presidential efforts to eliminate corruption and
enhance international training, the Russian police appear dedicated to establishing the laws
and policies designed to move closer to democratic police operations. Police operations
need to function in accordance with a Rechtsstaat concept, enabling a society to have the
knowledge and access to the law that is essential to hold the state accountable to its laws.
It appears that until the Russian legislature can enact positive measures to combat
crime the police will continue to be directly subordinate to the Russian President.
Measures to combat crime and move the police toward more democratic efforts will
remain vested in presidential decrees and directives. As Appendix B shows, the 1996
MVD Report on Crime depicts an overall 6% decrease in the rate of reported crimes and a
9% increase in crimes solved since 1995.
Overcoming the seventy years of Communist police terror has not been easy.
While Soviet President Gorbachev made the initial steps to provide for greater individual
rights, he was confronted with a perceived need to restore order. This led to an excessive
207
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use ofthe police for a political purpose - maintaining central control. This role is not that
of a professional police service in a democratic society. If President Yeltsin continues to
wrestle with the legislature, Russia's efforts to move toward the rule oflaw and
democratic police operations may be stifled. With a concerted effort at reform, as
younger generations of policemen are trained, not only in Russia but throughout the
world, the fundamental principles of professional police conduct and the motivation for
public safety may take hold. From the initial successes shown in the international training
efforts to improve Russian police motivation for public service and human rights, to an
effort to reduce corruption with Operation "Clean Hands," the environment is ripe in
Russia to espouse the democratic police motto ... "To Protect and Serve."
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APPENDIX A. 1996 RUSSIA CORRUPTION INDICTMENTS
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